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Abstract
Despite long-standing theoretical interest, empirical attempts at investigating the appropriate
level of decentralization remain scarce. This paper develops a simple and flexible framework to
test for the presence of public good spillovers between fiscally autonomous jurisdictions and in-
vestigate potential welfare gains from marginal fiscal integration. We build a quantitative spatial
equilibrium model of cities with mobile households and endogenous local public goods causing
spillovers across jurisdictional boundaries. We show how one can exploit migration and house price
responses to shocks in local public goods at different geographic scales to reveal the intensity of
spillovers. Applying our framework to the particularly fragmented French institutional setting, we
structurally estimate the model using a unique combination of administrative panel datasets on
cities. Estimation relies on plausibly exogenous variations in government subsidies to instrument
changes in the supply of local public goods. We find that public goods of neighboring cities account
for approximately 89-96% of total public goods benefiting residents of the average French city. Fi-
nally, we simulate the effect of a reform increasing fiscal integration and find substantial welfare
gains.
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1 Introduction
Take an economy divided into geographically distinct jurisdictions. Who should be providing local
public services? Local governments or the central government? If local jurisdictions are tasked with
providing public goods, what should be their boundaries? Since the seminal work of Tiebout (1956)
and Oates (1972), academics have investigated the optimal balance of power between local and more
centralized forms of government. Simply put, the political economy of centralized decision-making
misallocates local public services. On the other hand, decentralization is inefficient because of spatial
spillovers i.e. the extent to which a city’s local public goods also benefit its neighbors1. Yet, there
seems to be no consensus in practice about the optimal size and autonomy of cities and there remains
substantial variation in local jurisdictional organization across western countries. Average city popu-
lation is 4,300 in the EU compared to 16,000 in the US. Within the EU itself, there are large disparities
between otherwise comparable countries. Average city density is similar in Germany (179 inh. per
km2), France (154 inh. per km2) and Spain (177 inh. per km2). However, with mean city population
of respectively 7,100 and 5,800, German and Spanish jurisdictions are much larger than the average
French municipality only home to 1,753 inhabitants.
Jurisdictional fragmentation has important welfare consequences. To illustrate these, let us consider
three stylized channels. When spillovers are strong, local jurisdictions may under-provide local public
services as they do not internalize their benefits to neighboring jurisdictions. In addition, cities may
actively free-ride on neighboring cities’ public goods, worsening the under-provision problem. Finally,
spillovers create migration externalities. Residential choices influence the local political process pro-
viding public goods, thereby affecting neighboring cities’ welfare. Policy and institutional solutions to
remedy spillover inefficiencies typically include pigovian subsidies and boundary redefinition. While
the former solution requires the tailoring of subsidies to spillover intensity, one simply needs knowl-
edge of the presence of spillovers between jurisdictions of designated geographic areas to implement
the latter.
Although a rich theoretical literature studies efficient fiscal federalism (see Oates (2005) for a re-
view), empirical evidence on spillover inefficiency is scarce. There are indeed empirical and theoretical
challenges to disentangle public good spillovers from other general equilibrium mechanisms. First,
the difference between two cities in the level of public services provided by their neighbors may cap-
1Decentralization can be inefficient in many more ways e.g because of business tax competition. See Boadway and
Tremblay (2012) for a review. We abstract from these considerations in the present paper.
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ture differences in own residential and production fundamentals. Indeed, a productive and densely
populated neighbor will typically provide a high level of public services, and high rents and den-
sities in surrounding locations may just reflect spillovers between local labour markets or correlated
productivity shocks. Second, spatial spillovers interact with fiscal externalities in intricate ways2.
This paper revisits the local public good provision debate in a quantitative spatial equilibrium
model. Our contribution is twofold. First, we develop a simple framework to test for potential wel-
fare gains from arbitrary increases in the level of centralization of local public goods provision. We
ground it on a location choice model borrowed from the urban economics literature that allows us to
isolate public good spillovers from other mechanisms at play in equilibrium. The key ingredient is
the nesting of fiscally autonomous jurisdictions in geographic areas within which one suspect there
are cross-border spillovers. By studying migration and house price responses to local public good
shocks first between jurisdictions within nests, then between such nests, one can reveal the presence
of spillovers. Because these nesting areas can be made to encompass an arbitrary number of jurisdic-
tions, our framework allows to repeatedly test for the presence of spatial spillovers until reaching the
optimal jurisdictional fragmentation. To the best of our knowledge, this paper is the first attempt at
taking a structural approach to fiscal decentralization. Second, we apply our framework to French data
and provide new estimations of structural parameters that are key to the local public finance debate.
In the much fragmented French context, we estimate strong spatial spillovers and significant fiscal
externalities.
Our approach has two limitations. First, assessing the inefficiency cost of centralization is beyond
the scope of the present paper. These costs typically stem from the interaction between centralized
political frictions that tend to create winners and loosers, and heterogeneous local needs3. As such, we
abstract from the taste heterogeneity motivating the standard Tiebout literature and do not account for
interactions between local and central governments. Second, structural parameters may themselves be
endogenous to local public goods e.g. to the development of regional transit.
We first develop a spatial equilibrium model of cities that draws on the seminal framework of Rosen
(1974) and Roback (1982) and allows for endogenous wages, rents and local public good provision. We
let households be potentially infra-marginal in their migration choices by introducing heterogeneous
2Fiscal externalities arise when public goods are not private goods. In this case, the costs of providing residents with
a given level of public good benefits increase less than one for one with population. Denser cities typically provide more
public goods for less taxes which creates an agglomeration force.
3See for example Carbonnier et al. (2008) for an attempt at assessing both the costs of centralization and decentralization.
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preferences for cities. Our agents are otherwise homogeneous in skills and have identical preferences
for public goods over private consumption. They vote for local taxes and a level of public services
that will in turn affect equilibrium demand for cities. Most importantly, we allow for cross-border
public good spillovers in a simple flexible structure that keeps the model amenable to reduced-form
empirical analysis. Our model pinpoints key structural parameters related to spillovers, the rivalness
of local public goods, preference for public services, household mobility and housing supply elasticity.
Home to around 35, 000 autonomous municipalities accounting for 38% of EU’s total, France is
a natural context in which to apply our framework. We first provide difference-in-difference (DiD)
evidence on the impact of public good supply shocks on migration, housing consumption and house
prices using comprehensive administrative datasets on French cities. We combine data covering local
taxes and public spending, population, housing consumption, wages and house prices from 2000 to
2016. Our identification strategy exploits plausibly exogenous variation in investment-targeted sub-
sidies to instrument changes in local public goods. Overall, we find significant migration responses
and house price capitalization which we interpret as evidence that households are mobile, enjoy local
public services and that housing supply is not inelastic in the medium run. However, we find that
migration responses to public good shocks within groups of neighboring cities are smaller than when
comparing such groups between them. We also estimate significant house price capitalization in the
latter case and not in the former. In line with our theoretical framework, a candidate mechanism to ex-
plain these reduced-form results is the presence of spatial spillovers, rendering location decisions less
relevant for the enjoyment of publicly provided amenities within groups of close-knit jurisdictions.
We then take our theoretical framework to the data and use a Generalized Method of Moments
(GMM) to estimate the model’s parameters. Our identifying moments build on the subsidy shocks used
in our DiD models and harness underlying variation in housing supply elasticity across jurisdictions.
We find significant cross-border spillovers. Public services in neighboring cities account for 89-96%
of total public services benefiting a city’s residents. Our estimates for public spending preference
and housing supply elasticity lie within the range of the literature. Mobility of French households is
much higher than current estimates for the US, which reflects that the considered French jurisdictions
are much smaller geographic units. In a simple application of our method, we simulate the impact
of redefining French city boundaries along pre-existing administrative lines and find strong welfare
gains.
Our paper is related to the vast literature on fiscal decentralization. In his seminal paper, Tiebout
(1956) argues that decentralized public good provision is efficient because people “vote with their
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feet” to choose their optimal bundle of taxes and public goods. However, Bewley (1981) provides a
formal treatment of Tiebout’s ideas and concludes that this efficiency result only holds when assuming
away interesting features such as spatial spillovers and fiscal externalities. Following Oates (1972), a
rich theoretical literature investigates the consequences of spillovers on local public good provision
and efficient federalism (see for instance Gordon (1983), Wellisch (1994), Lockwood (2002), Besley and
Coate (2003), Bloch and Zenginobuz (2007), Cheikbossian (2008), Bloch and Zenginobuz (2015)).
Some empirical work tests the presence of spatial spillovers. Solé-Ollé (2006) investigates benefits
spillovers – when households enjoy public goods of neighboring cities – and congestion spillovers –
when households congest such public goods – in the case of local public spending in Spain. The author
finds significant evidence of both in equal magnitude. Case et al. (1993) offer a test when local public
goods of neighboring cities are complements and conclude to the existence of spillovers.
On the methodological side, our paper relates to the canonical spatial equilibrium framework of
Rosen (1974) and Roback (1982). Drawing on the seminal logit choice setup of McFadden (1973), this
workhorse model has since been extended to account for heterogeneous mobility frictions both for
households and firms (Fajgelbaum et al. (2015), Suárez Serrato and Zidar (2016)). We also relate to the
large literature studying Tiebout type models with endogenous public good provision (Konishi (1996),
Epple and Sieg (1999), Brueckner (2000), Bloch and Zenginobuz (2006)). Our work is also related to
recent research in urban economics modelling endogenous amenities such as Ahlfeldt et al. (2015),
Diamond (2016) or Fajgelbaum and Gaubert (2018). In our setup, amenities take the form of public
goods and taxes that are endogenous both because of household mobility and the local voting process.
Related empirical work has investigated Tiebout type drivers of migration decisions. Early work
such as Oates (1969) studies the impact of local fiscal amenities on house price capitalization. His
estimates show that property values are positively affected by public spending on schools and nega-
tively affected by local taxes. Banzhaf and Walsh (2008) look at the impact of a particular residential
amenity, air quality, on city density using large plants openings. The authors find that location choices
are environmentally motivated. Lutz (2015) estimates significant effects of lower property taxation
on residential investment and house prices, with magnitudes depending on the elasticity of housing
supply.
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 provides background on French local public
finance and presents some empirical regularities. In section 3, we develop our spatial equilibrium
model of cities with endogenous fiscal amenities. Section 4 describes our data and presents reduced-
form evidence on the impact of local public good supply shocks on different economic outcomes. In
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section 5, we use these shocks to structurally estimate our model with GMM. Section 6 presents welfare
implications. Section 7 concludes.
2 Institutional Background
In this section we provide some background on the French local institutional context. We give some
historical elements on the early acknowledgement of cross-border public good spillovers and gains
from coordination. We then present stylized facts to highlight the prevalence of cities in the provision
of local public services and lay the foundation for our empirical analysis by discussing cities’ finances.
The French local institutions belong to a four-tier system. As of 2017, the territory is divided into
35,352 cities (communes), nested in 1,266 municipal federations henceforth MF (intercommunalités), 100
counties (départements) and 13 provinces (régions). Following a series of decentralization laws starting
in the early 1980’s, France’s local authorities increasingly gained autonomy regarding local public
services. The 35,352 French cities represent around 38% of EU’s total4. The French government long
acknowledged that this large number of jurisdictions may be a source of inefficiency in the provision
of local public services5. Because of potential economies of scale, expected reduced tax competition
and better public service coordination, central authorities have created financial incentives encouraging
cities to merge into larger jurisdictions6. Local officials however, supported by their constituents, have
traditionally opposed such mergers. As a result, the number of cities have been fairly stable over time.
There were around 38,000 cities in the late 18th century, compared to roughly 35,000 in 2017. To bypass
political obstacles to mergers, central authorities introduced the possibility for neighbouring cities to
group into municipal federations. This new tier of local government, made up of elected officials from
member jurisdictions, would allow cities to coordinate without loosing autonomy. Initially optional,
being part of a municipal federation became compulsory in 2013. As a result, the share of federated
cities jumped from 74% in 2002 to 100% in 2016, with an average of 27 member cities per federation.
However, local cooperation beyond basic services remains limited and cities still control the lion’s share
of local public services.
French cities remain by far the largest provider of local public services as measured in e spending.
In 2015, the local public sector – cities, counties and provinces – spent e229 billion or 9.4% of GDP.
Cities accounted for 41 % of the total, followed by counties (35%), municipal federations (14%) and
4See data on local administrative areas by Eurostat https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/fr/web/nuts/local-administrative-units.
5See report by the French Senate https://www.senat.fr/rap/r05-193/r05-1931.html.
6See Leprince and Guengant (2002).
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provinces (11%). When looking at local infrastructure investments alone totalling e47 billion in 2015,
the relative weight of cities is even greater. City investments represented 41% of the total, twice as
much as counties (21%), provinces (20%) or municipal federations (18%). The composition of city
spending further justifies the focus of the present paper as French cities are the providers of amenities
that have been extensively studied in the Tiebout and urban literature. In 2009, spending on urban
planning, transport and environmental policies together represented 19% of the budget, kindergarten
and primary schools 13%, spending on youth and sports 10% and cultural projects 7%.
To finance local public services, cities have the autonomy to levy taxes7. In 2015, they raised around
e50 billion or 2% of GDP in direct and indirect taxes of which 33% were from the tax on resident
households, 28% from the tax on property owners, 20% from the local business tax, 2% from the land
tax and the remaining 17% from various small taxes (house transaction taxes, waste management tax
etc.)8. As an alternative source of funding, cities receive e17 billion in operating subsidies to cover
operating (i.e. non-investment) expenditure. These subsidies are formula-based – loosely speaking
increasing with population and decreasing with mean income – and mostly coming from the central
government. Finally, cities receive around e13 billion from other smaller sources such as various user
fees. Together, these sources of funding cover 116% of cities’ annual operating expenses (around e69
billion in 2015), the 16% surplus being invested in infrastructure.
In 2015, French cities invested e19 billion in local infrastructure. Funding in the form of general
endowments and investment-targeted subsidies accounted for 42% of total investment, the remaining
58% being financed by operating surpluses and additional debt. General endowments can take the
form of in-kind gifts from the central government, or non-targeted and automatic transfers such as
VAT refunds on infrastructure expenditure. Investment-targeted subsidies however are more specific
and aimed at financing well-defined investment projects. These are awarded by the boards of counties,
provinces and by the central government to cities that were successful in their grant application. While
we do not observe city applications to investment grants, we will argue that these subsidies are a
plausibly exogenous shock in local public good supply.
There is substantial cross-sectional variation in investment subsidies received each year. For the
purpose of our paper we define a city’s subsidy stock in year t as the sum of subsidies ever received by
the city up to t. This subsidy stock concept captures how much of a city’s durable public goods is being
7This autonomy, however, is constrained by the presence of several rules limiting year-on-year variations in tax rates.
8Source: Finance Ministry.
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financed by public funds coming from a higher layer of government9. To make yearly subsidies more
comparable between cities, we operate some normalization. We divide each subsidy amount received
in year t by the subsidy stock at year t− 1. The normalized yearly subsidy can then be interpreted as
the growth in the city’s subsidy stock.
Then, we subtract to each city-level observation the national or own MF average. In Figure 1 we
report the resulting distributions pooling subsidy stocks’ yearly growth in 2007, 2009 and 201010. Panel
A shows the pooled distribution of this percentage change in excess of the national percentage change.
It exhibits substantial variation with the 1st percentile being at −11% and the 99th percentile at +59%.
Panel B shows a slightly modified distribution, where each city subsidy percentage change is taken
relative to the mean change in the city’s MF. Again, it exhibits substantial dispersion with the 1st
percentile being at −19% and the 99th percentile at +51%.
3 Theoretical Model
This section develops our spatial equilibrium model. It extends the seminal framework of Rosen (1974)
and Roback (1982) to account for heterogeneous preferences for cities in the spirit of the recent urban
economics literature. Most importantly, we allow for endogenous rents, wages, local public goods
and taxes. A distinguishing feature of our model is its focus on local public goods. Endogenous
fiscal amenities – taxes and public spending – are central in households’ location decisions and are
determined through an elementary voting mechanism.
The model shares some methodological features with the urban or economic geography frame-
works of Busso et al. (2013), Ahlfeldt et al. (2015), Suárez Serrato and Zidar (2016), Diamond (2016)
and Fajgelbaum and Gaubert (2018). There is a finite collection of J jurisdictions – that we will inter-
changeably call cities – indexed by j with fixed boundaries, as well as a finite collection of A mutually
exclusive geographic areas indexed by a in which the J jurisdictions are nested. Because these nesting
areas can be made arbitrarily large, our framework is flexible enough to accommodate many institu-
tional settings. We note aj the area j belongs to.
There is a continuum of imperfectly mobile households of measure 1, Nj being the share of house-
holds living in city j. Households inelastically supply one unit of labor in their city of residence. City
9Subsidies financing durable investments are recorded as a liability stock in the municipal accounts. They are depreciated
at the same speed as the investment they help financing to keep reflecting their current contribution to local assets.
10Our data are from the French municipal financial accounts (balance comptable des communes) that we present in more
details in section 4
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j is characterized by a vector of endogenous observables – wage wj, rental price rj, local public good
Gj, ad valorem housing tax τhj and business tax τ
k
j – as well as unobserved residential amenities. Local
public goods are financed by local taxes as well as subsidies coming from the central government. A
national proportional income tax τw finances central funding to the J jurisdictions. The sections below
describe how demand for cities, housing supply, wages and local public goods are endogenously set
in equilibrium.
3.1 Preferences
In order to easily connect theory and empirical analysis, we develop our conceptual framework in a
Cobb-Douglas environment. Utility of household i living in city j is given by
U(C, G, i, j) = C1−φGφEAj eµij (1)
where C, G, EAj and µij are detailed below.
Consumption Agents enjoy aggregate consumption C defined by
C = c1−αhα (2)
where c is consumption of the nationally traded good taken as the numéraire and h is m2 housing
consumption. Parameter α ∈ [0, 1] is the housing consumption share which we assume to be constant
across households. Given post-tax rental prices r(1 + τh) and net income (1− τw)w, consumption of
the numéraire good is
c = (1− τw)w− r(1 + τh)h (3)
Public good Agents derive utility from G, an aggregate public good measure. It takes as arguments
the congested public good of the city they live in and that of all other cities belonging to the same area
a due to the presence of cross-boundary spillovers. G will be endogenously determined along with
local taxes. Parameter φ ∈ [0, 1] captures the taste for public good relative to private consumption. We
assume that φ is homogeneous across households11. For a city j, public goods of cities belonging to aj
enter Gj with equal spillover weights while spillovers coming from cities outside of aj are zero. This
binary structure for spillovers’ spatial decay is simplistic yet allows to flexibly test for their presence in
11We hence depart from the Tiebout framework with people sorting according to their taste for public good.
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different settings. Aggregate public good Gj in j is defined as a geometric average between own and
neighbours’ congested public goods
Gj = G
δ
j
∏
j′∈aj
G
(1−δ)/|aj|
j′ (4)
where aj is the geographic area j belongs to and |aj| its cardinal i.e the number of member cities.
Parameter δ ∈ [0, 1] controls the intensity of spillovers that is, the extent to which households benefit
from local public goods of neighbouring jurisdictions. When δ = 1 there are no spillovers and residents
only enjoy the public services provided in their city. When δ = 0 there are full spillovers within any
area a so that the city of residence does not matter for the enjoyment of public goods found in cities of
a, conditional on living in a. We adopt a symmetric approach for modelling congestion. We model Gj,
the congested public good of city j, as
Gj =
GjÇ
N
δ
j
∏
j′∈aj
N
(1−δ)/|aj|
j′
åκ (5)
with Gj a local public good index which we detail later on. Parameter κ ∈ [0, 1] controls the intensity
of congestion. When κ = 1, public good is fully rival and public good benefits are appropriately
measured by per capita spending. When κ = 0, public good is fully non-rival and public good benefits
are appropriately measured by absolute public spending. As such, κ is a parameter central to fiscal
externalities. The spillover parameter δ is also involved in determining the amount of congestion
deteriorating the benefits from Gj. It controls how much of public service congestion is coming from
neighbouring cities as a direct consequence of symmetric benefit spillovers. Absent spillovers, δ = 1
and public good in j is only congested by residents of j. When δ = 0, public good in j is equally
enjoyed and congested by all residents of aj.
Residential amenities City j is further characterized by unobserved residential amenities EAj . They
capture the mean appeal of the city’s fixed characteristics across individuals and include traditional
amenities such as weather, geographic location, etc. They also capture time-varying amenities other
than those explicitly modeled. These amenities are equally valued by all residents of j.
Idiosyncratic taste shocks Each individual i draws a vector (µi1, ..., µi J) of idiosyncratic shocks. These
µij’s are assumed to be i.i.d across and among individuals and distributed Extreme Value Type-I with
parameters (0, σ). They represent individual-city specific utility premia and notably capture hetero-
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geneity in mobility costs and in the valuation of cities’ fixed amenities12. Parameter σ controls the
dispersion of these idiosyncratic draws and is inversely related to household mobility. When σ is
higher, density around the indifference threshold between any two cities is thinner as more house-
holds are infra-marginal. As a consequence, the migration response to a marginal change in the appeal
of one city relative to the other gets smaller.
Model parameters to be estimated so far are {σ, φ, κ, δ} respectively capturing inverse household
mobility, taste for the public good, public good congestion and cross-boundary spillovers. The housing
consumption share α will be calibrated from the literature.
3.2 Conditional Housing Demand
Conditional on living in j, agent i decides how much housing to consume while being net wage, rental
price and tax taker. Given the constant share assumption, conditional individual housing demand and
numéraire consumption equal
hDj = α
(1− τw)wj
rj(1 + τhj )
cj = (1− α)(1− τw)wj
(6)
and do not depend on i. Per capita housing and numéraire consumption will hence be treated as
endogenous city amenities.
3.3 Demand for Cities
Agent i chooses to live in the city that maximizes U(C, G, i, j). We can write
ln U(C, G, i, j) = vj + µij (7)
where
vj = (1− φ) ln(Cj) + φ ln(Gj) + ln(EAj ) (8)
Households first solve for optimal housing and numéraire good consumption conditional on city of
residence according to (6). After the realization of idiosyncratic shocks µij, they make the extensive
margin choice of where to live upon observing local consumption amenities Cj’s, public services Gj’s
12An interpretation of a higher value for µij relative to any other µij′ is j being the city in which i was born, educated
and socialized. Another interpretation is heterogeneity in preferences for local exogenous amenities (e.g. weather, natural
amenities etc.).
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as well as exogenous amenities EAj ’s. When comparing different cities, households are thus vj takers.
This conditional logit setup was first introduced by McFadden (1973) in a broader context of discrete
choices. Demand for city j then equals the expected set of households for which it yields the highest
utility i.e. NDj = E
î
1{uij>uiq ∀ q 6=j}
ó
. Because idiosyncratic shocks are distributed Extreme Value Type-I
and enter utility separately from other components, demand for city j is equal to
NDj =
exp(vj/σ)∑
j′
exp(vj′/σ)
(9)
Loosely speaking, demand for city j is the ratio between how attractive the city is and the mean city
appeal in the country. Note that with (9) no city is empty and the market for cities clears i.e.∑
j
NDj = 1 (10)
Total housing demand in city j is then the result of intensive margin consumption and extensive margin
in-migration
HDj = h
D
j N
D
j (11)
3.4 Housing Supply
We assume that a representative absentee landlord has the opportunity to put existing homes on the
market or to develop new ones, rented at a price r per m2 of housing. The marginal opportunity or
development cost is increasing in the quantity of housing already on the market and decreasing in the
city area T. Formally, the cost of providing housing is given by
Cj(H, Tj) =
Ç
H
Tj
å1+ 1ηj
ECj
where ηj is the housing supply elasticity. Further differences in local housing supply determinants are
captured by the cost shifter ECj . Since it enters the housing supply cost function in a multiplicative way,
it is isomorphic to a reduction in available land according to T/EC
η
1+η . Profit maximization yields the
inverse housing supply equation
ln(rj) =
1
ηj
ln
ÇHSj
Tj
å
+ ln(ECj ) (12)
3.5 Labor Demand
Local labor markets are not the focus of this paper. However, our analysis needs to account for en-
dogenous wages as they are potentially affected by endogenous business taxation and productivity e.g
through public investments.
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The national good is produced in each jurisdiction j with a constant returns to scale technology
F(Kj, Nj) = Nj f (χj) where Kj is capital input, χj = Kj/(θYj Nj) the capital to effective labor ratio and θ
Y
j
is labor productivity. We assume that capital is supplied in all cities at a rental rate R that is fixed on
international markets and that local business taxation is proportional to the outflow of local interests.
We assume absentee capital owners. Firms equate the marginal product of each factor to its cost so
that
f ′(χj) = (1 + τk)R
and
θYj [ f (χj)− χj f ′(χj)] = wj
The first of these conditions can be rewritten as χj = Z
Ä
R(1 + τk)
ä
with Z′ ≤ 0 and the second
condition becomes
wj = θYj L
Ä
(1 + τk)R
ä
(13)
with L(x) = f (Z(x)) − Z(x)x. With this formulation, local wages are negatively affected by an in-
crease in the local business tax. They are positively affected by productivity shocks θYj that may be
endogenous to local public goods13.
3.6 Public Good Supply
We let public good G be a Cobb-Douglas index
ln G = ϕ ln Gs + (1− ϕ) ln G f (14)
where Gs is the stock of public capital and G f the flow of services annually consumed. We check
the empirical validity of this specification in section 4. In practice, public durable investments typically
includes schools, transportation infrastructure, parks improvements, sports facilities, museums, etc.
Non-investment expenditure is typically composed of staff expenditure, maintenance of infrastructure,
external services and subsidies to local associations. Both are directly measured as spending in terms
of the numéraire good and we abstract from differences in public good provision efficiency. Residents
13Our empirical analysis would not be affected if we allowed for a more general production function with decreasing
returns to scale (e.g. because of land use) or productivity agglomeration or spillovers effects as long as we econometricians
observe the resulting wage. We would simply replace our inverse labor demand equation by a reduced form such as
wj
Å
Nj, Kj, τkj , {Nj′ , Kj′}j′ 6=j, {θ
Y
j′ }j′ , R
ã
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vote on the residence tax τh, the business tax τk and the amount of Gs and G f . Because we assumed
homogeneous preferences, the voting mechanism is akin to a maximization problem by a local social
planner. We assume that residents are myopic and do not anticipate migration responses.
Residents commit to policy {Gs,G f ,τh,τk} for current and all future periods14. They pay for G f every
year. Durable investments depreciate at the annual rate ρ. To maintain a constant level of infrastructure,
residents hence have to pay Gs the first year and ρGs every following year.
Cities inherit zero net wealth from the past15. However, they anticipate a flow of future subsidies
{Ft}∞0 and have access to international debt markets with fixed interest rate R. Residents’ preferred
policy is found by maximizing
(1− α) ln
Ä
(1− τw)w− r(1 + τh)h
ä
+ α ln h +
φ
1− φ δ
Ä
ϕ ln Gs + (1− ϕ) ln G f
ä
(15)
over {Gs, G f , τh, τk} subject to city inter-temporal budget constraint
ζGs + G f = τhrH + τkRK +
R
1 + R
ñ ∞∑
t=0
Ç
1
1 + R
åt
Ft
ô
(16)
where ζ = (ρ + R)/(1 + R). Subsidies are financed by a national income tax τw that endogenously
adjusts so that national budget is balanced every year i.e.
τw =
∑
j Fj∑
j Njwj
(17)
Although we dot not solve for local policies in the comprehensive case, this framework will be
useful in our welfare application in section 6.
3.7 Equilibrium
Definition 1. Given the model’s parameters {σ, φ, ϕ, κ, δ, η, α, ζ} and national subsidies {Ft}∞0 an equilibrium is
defined by an allocation {Nj, Hj, wj, rj, Gj, τhj , τkj , τw} determined by the following system of equations: demand
for cities (2), (3), (14), (5), (8), (9); conditional housing demand (6); housing supply (12); labor demand (13);
local taxes and public good and national budget constraint (17).
Because of agglomeration forces in the model, Definition 1 may not characterize a unique equilib-
rium. We argue in section 5 that structural parameters can be uniquely identified nonetheless.
14Appendix C shows that policy choices are time-consistent if the environment stays constant. When there is a shock to the
environment (e.g. in local amenities or public subsidies) cities change their equilibrium policy which is again time-consistent.
15Appendix C shows that under no-Ponzi conditions, cities inherit exactly zero net wealth from past periods. Hence, there
is no path-dependency in local public goods choices even in the presence of durable investments and a seemingly dynamic
problem collapses into a static one.
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3.8 Structural Residuals
We use equilibrium equations to uniquely identify changes in amenity and housing supply funda-
mentals as functions of structural parameters and changes in observable endogenous variables. These
residual expressions will form the basis of our moment conditions used in our GMM estimation in sec-
tion 5. For residential fundamentals, we distinguish between within-a relative changes – i.e. changes
in city j’s residual relative to mean changes in aj – and between-a relative changes – i.e. mean residual
changes taken at the a level relative to their national mean –. This method presents two advantages.
First it allows to absorb the unobserved denominator of equation (9) roughly representing the mean
attractiveness of cities in the country by expressing residuals in relative terms16. Second and given the
assumption on the structure of spillovers, looking at within-a vs between-a changes helps isolating the
spillover parameter δ.
We first use equations characterizing demand for cities to uniquely identify changes in unobserved
residential amenities. Taking the log of the demand for cities equation (9) and plugging in city appeal
equation (8), consumption equations (2) and (6), and public good definitions (14) and (5) allows us to
uniquely express residential amenities ln(EAj ) as a function of endogenous observables and structural
parameters
ln(EAj ) = −(1− φ)(1− α) ln(1− τw)− (1− φ)(1− α) ln(wj)
− (1− φ)α ln(hj)− φδ ln(Gj)− φ(1− δ)
1
|aj|
∑
j′∈aj
ln(Gj′)
+
Ä
σ + κφδ2
ä
ln(Nj) + φ(1− δ2)κ
1
|aj|
∑
j′∈aj
ln(Nj′)
+ σ ln
∑
j′
exp(vj′/σ) + constant
(18)
Within-a transformed residuals Subtracting to each ln(EAj ) its within-aj arithmetic mean allows us to
absorb all right-hand-side terms common across cities of aj as well as any time fixed effect contained in
ln(EAj ). Finally, we first-difference the resulting equation to absorb potential city fixed effects contained
16We identify the model’s parameters by looking at relative changes in observables without having to either fix the utility
of one city, impose an outside option yielding fixed utility or make the first order approximation of assuming that cities are
small so that the denominator of (9) is unaffected by changes in one city. See for instance the seminal work of McFadden
(1973) and more recently Diamond (2016) or Fajgelbaum et al. (2015) for examples of how this technical point is dealt with.
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in ln(EAj ). The final expression for these transformed residuals is
∆ ln EAj =
Ä
σ + κφδ2
ä
∆ ln Nj − (1− α)(1− φ)∆ ln wj
− α(1− φ)∆ ln hj − δφ∆ ln Gj
(19)
where
X j =
Xj∏
j′∈aj
X
1
|aj |
j′
for any variable X and ∆ is the first-difference operator between any two arbitrary periods. Trans-
formed residuals (19) characterize the change in residential amenities of a given city j relative to the
average amenity change in the a it belongs to. They difference out any time-invariant component in
cities’ unobserved residential amenities, because we take first-differences. They also difference out any
component which is common across all jurisdictions of a same a in a given year because we divide
endogenous variables by their geometric mean at the a level. Therefore, the mean of these transformed
residuals across cities is necessarily equal to zero. Note that with full spillovers (δ = 0), within-a rela-
tive public good changes have no effect on within-a relative migration responses as location does not
matter for the enjoyment of public goods conditional on living in a. Alternatively, one can plug in the
housing consumption expression from equation (6) and
∆ ln EAj =
Ä
σ + κφδ2
ä
∆ ln Nj − (1− φ)∆ ln wj
+ α(1− φ)∆ ln rj + α(1− φ)∆ ln Tj − δφ∆ ln Gj
(20)
where T = 1 + τh.
Between-a transformed residuals Going back to equation (18), we first take its average at the a level
for each a. Treating a as the new level of observation we then subtract to each new residential amenity
expression the national arithmetic mean across all a’s. The final expression for these transformed
residuals is
∆ ln ÊAa =
Ä
σ + κφ
ä
∆ ln N̂a − (1− α)(1− φ)∆ ln ŵa
− α(1− φ)∆ lnıha − φ∆ ln Ĝa (21)
where
X̂a =
∏
j∈a
X
1
|a|
j
∏
a′
Ç ∏
j∈a′
X
1
|a′ |
j
å 1
A
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for any variable X and A is the number of areas a. Transformed residuals (21) characterize the mean
residential amenity change in a given a relative to the mean change of that same variable at the national
level. They similarly absorb the a fixed effects and time fixed effects component of ln ÊAa . Importantly,
these between-a transformed residuals do not feature parameter δ. Indeed, public good spillovers are
contained within each a while equation (21) is at the a level. Alternatively, one can plug in the housing
consumption expression from equation (6) and
∆ ln ÊAa =
Ä
σ + κφ
ä
∆ ln N̂a − (1− φ)∆ ln ŵa
+ α(1− φ)∆ ln Ùra + α(1− φ)∆ lnıTa − φ∆ ln Ĝa (22)
Housing supply transformed residuals Using housing supply equation (12), we similarly express
changes in normalized housing supply residuals by forcing ηj = η
∆ ln ECj = ∆ ln rj −
1
η
∆ ln Hj
∆ ln ÊCa = ∆ ln Ùra − 1η ∆ ln Ĥa (23)
While we will rely on underlying differences in ηj in our GMM estimation, this specification allows us
to estimate an “average” housing supply elasticity.
3.9 From Residuals to Reduced-Form Evidence
Residual equations (19), (21) and (23) will be the foundation of our moment conditions in the GMM
estimation. In the empirical analysis, the a’s will be the municipal federations (MF) in their 2016 form
introduced in section 2. Investigating whether these groupings of cities are relevant for further fiscal
integration makes economic and historical sense. Indeed, as argued in section 2, cities grouped in MFs
to internalize in part public goods externalities and rationalize costs.
The GMM estimation will use instruments for changes in the supply of local public goods. To
be a valid instrument, a shock Z will need to verify E[∆ ln E × Z] = 0 that is be uncorrelated with
changes in unobserved residential amenities or housing supply determinants. As can be seen in (19),
(21) and (23), our residuals linearly depend on observables. DiD type reduced-form evidence showing
that E[∆ ln Y × Z] = 0 for all outcomes Y in pre-shock periods would make the case for Z as an
instrument. Section 4 presents such evidence and argues that investment-targeted subsidies are a
plausibly exogenous source of variation in public good supply. The exact definition of our instrument
will differ whether we investigate within-MF or between-MF behavioral responses.
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We expect a relatively higher public good supply shock to increase relative migration towards
targeted cities, increase total housing consumption, bid up equilibrium rents in the housing market
and consequently lower per capita housing m2 consumption. Because of public good spillover effects
within MFs, we would expect within-MF changes in public good supply to have a smaller impact than
between-MF changes. Although labor markets are not the focus of this paper, we can conjecture that
potential productivity increases would bid up equilibrium wages17.
4 Reduced-Form Evidence
This section lays the foundation for the GMM estimation of our spatial equilibrium model. It presents
the results of DiD models looking at the impact of changes in local public goods on changes in a
range of economic outcomes – population, housing consumption, house prices and wages –. We take
advantage of a unique combination of panel administrative datasets that were obtained from the French
Department of Finance and Department of Housing. We first introduce the data and describe how we
construct the variables present in the model. We then detail our empirical strategy and discuss our
graphical reduced-form evidence.
4.1 Data
We combine a variety of administrative and publicly available datasets at the city level covering the
2000-2016 period.
Sample Our sample is the universe of mainland French municipalities that experience no boundary
changes between 1999 and 2016. Not dropping municipalities experiencing boundary changes – such
as municipalities merging or acquiring land from others – may lead to artificial variation in their supply
of local public goods, population and economic outcomes. Fortunately, very few cities experience such
changes and this manipulation leaves us with 34, 835 cities i.e. 96% of them, and an almost-complete
partition of the French mainland territory.
Municipal financial accounts We use detailed municipal financial accounts (Balance Comptable des
Communes) obtained from the French Department of Finance for every year between 2002 and 2016.
17Note that although it is not modeled here, a public good supply shock may come with a public labor demand shock that
would increase equilibrium wages.
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Financial accounts give us municipalities’ detailed asset and liability position as well as the composition
of their yearly budget. Although it would be of great interest to disentangle the various components
of local public services, we are unable to classify the various items by their nature as the existing
categories follow accounting definitions. It bears little consequence however as the endeavour of the
present paper is more general and seeks to address the broad inefficiencies in the provision of local
public services and not the effect of one particular type of investment.
We construct our public investment variable Gs as the sum of all public assets minus the raw value
of the land and financial assets such as cash18. They are recorded at book value and account for in-
vestment depreciation. As mentioned in section 2, investments notably include schools, transportation
infrastructure, parks improvements, sports facilities, museums, art collections, etc. They also include
investment subsidies to other parties such as local clubs and associations. Importantly, Gs does not
contain social housing units19. The flow of services annually consumed G f is constructed as the sum
of staff expenditure, maintenance spending, payments for external services and operating subsidies to
third parties. We exclude interests payments as they do not correspond to consumable services.
As detailed in section 2 and formalized in section 3, public services are financed by local taxes and
by various subsidies from the central government and upper layers of local government. Specifically,
we construct a measure of the stock of investment-targeted subsidies S as the sum of all investment
subsidies ever received by cities from counties, provinces and the central government minus all asso-
ciated depreciation. As mentioned in section 2, S depreciates together with the public capital it helped
financing. We will see that S proves a good basis for instrumenting our public good index G. In 2016,
S represents 23% of the financing of our measure of public capital Gs. Endowments accounts for 28%
while the remaining 41% are from local contributions – past (reserves) or future (debt) –.
Population and housing We use FILOCOM (Fichier des Logements par Communes) which is an ex-
haustive database on household housing stock. It gives information on each non-commercial dwelling
every two year between 1995 and 2015. We know the location of each dwelling, its surface, vacancy
status and whether it is a main or a secondary home. We also know the number of person who live
in it and whether it is rented or owner-occupied. We use it to construct our city-level population and
18Taking out the raw value of the land seems natural as residents are unlikely to value it. Given that land is mostly a gift
from the central government, erasing this asset as well as the corresponding liability from the balance sheet is neutral in our
analysis. Cash and other liquid assets can be considered negative debt and are accounted for in our theoretical framework
in the form of future taxes.
19Social housing units, when publicly owned, are held by ad-hoc entities and not by cities.
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housing database which contains the stock of rented or owner-occupied main homes per city and the
total and per capita housing m2 surface. Population Nj from the model is all inhabitants of dwelling
units for which the head of household is aged 20 to 65 in city j. Total housing consumption Hj is how
much m2 are consumed by the Nj residents, and per capita housing consumption is hj = Hj/Nj.
House prices We use data on house prices instead of rents as there is no database on rents at the
city level. We combine housing transactions database from the notary offices (named BIEN for the
Parisian region and PERVAL for the rest of France). We construct a database on house prices per m2
for every two years between 2000 and 2014 at the city level. We assume house transaction prices from
the notary data are the net present value of unobserved rents r. Proportional changes in r thus equal
proportional changes in house prices. This method bears two caveats, one methodological and the
other regarding the quality of the price data. First, although tenants pay rent every year – explicitly or
implicitly –, not all cities record house transactions every year. As such, we can infer the rent growth
of a city only when it experiences a transaction in two consecutive periods. Second, the coverage of
house transactions in the notary data is not exhaustive and there is notable under-reporting in rural
areas.
Local tax data We use detailed local tax data (Recensement des Eléments d’Imposition à la Fiscalité Directe
Locale – REI) for every year from 2002 to 2016. It features all tax bases and rates at the city level. We
compute the ad-valorem local residence tax of the model from observed residence tax revenues Revh,
total housing stock H and house prices p at the city level: τh = RevhHr where house prices are the net
present value of rents r = R1+R × p.
Wages We use labor income data from IRCOM (Impôt sur le Revenu par Commune) dataset. It summa-
rizes labor and social security total income at the city level from 2002 to 2016. We construct our city
wage measure w as total labor income divided by number of tax units reporting positive labor income.
Socio-demographics and geographic data We use census data to get city-level information on total
population and socio-demographic characteristics for years 1990, 1999, 2008 and 2013. We also use
publicly provided data from the National Statistical Institute on city geography (municipal federation
it belongs to, distance to center of urban area center, superficy etc.). Although our analysis does not
study the public services handled by municipal federations, we use these geographical groupings for
the definition of the a’s. From 2000 to 2016, municipalities gradually joined MFs. In 2016, all munici-
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palities belonged to municipal federations. We assign each municipality to its 2016 MF for the whole
duration of our panel so that these geographical groupings are constant over time.
Table 1 gives elementary descriptive statistics on cities summarizing some of the above constructed
variables.
4.2 The Public Good Index
The public good index G aims at capturing the comprehensive level of public services in a city by
allowing both durable facilities Gs and annual spending Gf to benefit residents. To make sure that our
constructed measures for Gs and Gf correctly reflect the amount of services chosen at the local level,
we first check that they satisfy standard budget requirements. We can then directly calibrate the ratio
Gs
G f to recover parameter ϕ. We first estimate parameter ρ by calibrating asset depreciation based on
municipal financial accounts. Our central estimate is ρ = 0.010. Then we calibrate parameter R from
interests paid as a share of the debt stock. Our central estimate is R = 0.041. Both estimates are robust
across different calibration methods. We are then able to calibrate parameter ζ = ρ+R1+R with a central
estimate of ζ = 0.049. Finally, we estimate the ratio G
s
G f =
ϕ
(1−ϕ)ζ with a log-log regression reproduced
in Panel A of Figure 2. The Figure substantiates our Cobb-Douglas specification as the slope is close
to unity and residuals quite small as indicated by the large R2. Point estimate for the intercept is
1/0.074 ≈ 13.5 that is capital investment approximately equals 13.5 years of operating expenditures.
This leads to a central estimate ϕ = 0.378. We can then rewrite our public good index G as
G = Gs
Ç
1− ϕ
ϕ
ζ
å1−ϕ
≈ 0.208× Gs
4.3 Empirical Strategy
We instrument changes in local public goods using variation in plausibly exogenous investment-
targeted subsidies documented in section 2. We use DiD models following Suárez Serrato and Zidar
(2016) and Fuest et al. (2018) and look at cumulative changes in a range of economic outcomes around
subsidy shocks. In line with the theoretical framework, we look at both within-MF and between-MFs
variations in public goods and endogenous variables.
The construction of our instrument warrants a careful explanation. We want to instrument propor-
tional changes in the endogenous variables in line with equation (19), (21) and (23). A good candidate
instrument is the flow of future subsidies {Ft}t anticipated by the municipality. Unfortunately we do
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not observe these flows. However, we do observe current investment subsidy stocks S which capture
the current size of national (and regional and county) contribution to local public goods. Following
a simple ricardian equivalence argument, current subsidy stocks are isomorphic to streams of future
investment subsidy flows. Hence, current changes in the subsidy stock, if exogenous, will provide an
instrument for the unobserved flow of future subsidies thereby for the current level of public services
G. Formally, our instrument is
∆ ln Sj,t,t−1 (24)
for within-MF regressions i.e. the yearly log change in city subsidy stock minus the average log change
in the city’s MF,
∆ ln ÛSa,t,t−1 (25)
for between-MF regressions i.e. the yearly log change in the geometric mean of city subsidy stocks in
a MF minus their average at the national (or regional, or county) level.
For a shock in a given year call d the distance (in years) from the shock, a negative d meaning
prior to the shock. We run a separate regression for each d ∈ [−4, 4] where the dependent variable
is ∆ ln Yd,−6 (or ∆ ln ÛYd,−6) that is outcome relative cumulative growth over the time period starting
8 years prior to the shock and ending d years from the shock. The main explanatory variable is the
1-year subsidy relative growth ∆ ln S1,0 (or ∆ ln ÛS1,0).
While we look at the 1-year difference in the instrument, we look at long differences in post-shock
outcomes to account for construction delays, frictions in year-on-year responses by individuals and
more generally for dynamic adjustments to the shock. Regression coefficients we obtain are interpreted
as cumulative elasticities. To deal with potential serial correlation of the instrument we also control
for all subsidy shocks happening before the shock year and before period d that is we control for all
∆ ln Sk,k−1 with k ≤ min{d,−1} (or ∆ ln ÛSk,k−1).
We pool shocks happening in 2007, 2009 and 2010 and keep only the [−4, 4] distance windows
around shock years to have a balanced panel in terms of distance to the shock20. We limit ourselves
to these shocks for two reasons. First, we want to have sufficient temporal depth – i.e. 4 years of
cumulative growth pre-shock – to inspect the pre-trends. This mechanically reduces the scope to
shocks happening around the middle of our sample. Second, we do not include the 2008 subsidies
since 2008 is a city council election year and we suspect (and empirically confirm) that subsidies that
20These distributed lag type of regressions are similar to the empirical setup of Fuest et al. (2018) and Suárez Serrato and
Zidar (2016). However, contrary to us they do not restrict the sample to be balanced around event years which could typically
leads to composition effect biases.
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year were much more endogenous to city conditions. Formally, we run the following regressions
∆ ln Y j,d,−6 = βWd ∆ ln Sj,0,−1 +
min{d,−1}∑
k=−6
βWk ∆ ln Sj,k,k−1 + Ij · γWd + uWj,d (26)
for within-MF specifications,
∆ ln ÛYa,d,−6 = βBd ∆ ln ÛSa,0,−1 + min{d,−1}∑
k=−6
βBk ∆ ln ÛSa,k,k−1 + Ia · γBd + uBa,d (27)
for between-MF specifications for each d ∈ [−4, 4]. I is a vector of flexible dummies for 1999 baseline
characteristics21. We include it as changes in unobserved amenities or housing supply costs of the
model may be correlated with these observed characteristics. We cluster standard errors at the MF
level to account for spatial correlation of the error term as well as auto-correlation since our regressions
superimpose shocks happening in different years.
For both within-MF and between-MF regressions, we investigate responses from population, hous-
ing per capita, total housing, wage, rents, residence tax and the public good index. We estimate the
reduced-form elasticities βd’s. They represent how the instrument affects cumulative outcome growth
from -6 to d. These specifications absorb city or MF fixed effects because we take first differences. They
also absorb time fixed effects because we divide each observation by its MF or national (or regional, or
county) geometric mean. The identifying assumption is that the amount and timing of increases in the
investment-targeted subsidy stock are as good as random. Absence of pre-trends i.e. βd = 0 for d < 0
for all outcomes of our within-MF and between-MF regressions would strongly support this claim.
4.4 DiD Results
We present graphical evidence on the evolution of our different outcomes around subsidy shocks based
on our within-MF and between-MF DiD models. These graphs have no immediate “treatment effect”
interpretation but show how the gradient of different outcomes is affected by presumably exogenous
changes in subsidy stocks. Their contribution, however, is twofold. They provide convincing evidence
of absence of selection into treatment, as well as of significant behavioral responses to changes in local
public services.
Within-MF behavioural responses Figure 3 shows the first stage result i.e. how the cumulative
growth of our public good index evolves around a sudden investment subsidy shock. The graph
21Controls include normalized baseline 1999 city population and density.
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reports our DiD coefficients βd that is, the effect of the shock in d = 0 on public good’s cumulative
growth starting in d = −6. Visual inspection of the pre-trends confirms the exclusion restriction. Before
d = 0, cumulative growth is flat and while it is significantly different from zero, it is not economically
significant compared to the subsequent hike. After d = 0, growth in G becomes strongly positively
correlated with the shock. A 1% change in the stock of investment-targeted subsidies leads to a 0.369%
change in the public good index after five years. All changes are relative to the mean changes in the MF.
This effect is significant at the 1% level. Although this reduced-form elasticity bears no interpretation
in itself, it confirms the strong relevance of our instrument.
We now turn to the reduced-form effect of subsidy shocks on population. Figure 4 shows that treat-
ment intensity is not correlated with city migration dynamics prior to d = 0. However, cities which
received a relatively higher subsidy shock subsequently experienced relatively higher in-migration. A
1% relative increase in investment-targeted subsidies leads to a 0.026% relative increase in population
after five years. This effect is significant at the 1% level. Put together with the first stage result, the
reduced-form elasticity of population to public spending within a municipal federation is approxi-
mately 0.07. In other words, when city public spending grows 10pp more than (geometric) mean
public spending in the MF, city population grows 0.7pp more than (geometric) mean population in the
MF.
It is useful to give a concrete example illustrating the intensity of migration responses within
municipal federations. Consider a municipal federation a in its final 2016 form with mean number of
member cities (27 city members) all having 2009 mean population (1,000 residents), mean investment
level (e9,400,000) and mean operating expenditure (e1,540,000). Let us abstract from public good
depreciation for simplicity. Assume that city j of a raises its investment level and yearly expenditure
by 10%, that is invests e940,000 in durable infrastructure and commits to increase yearly expenditure
by e154,000. All other member cities of a decrease them by 10%/26 = 0.384% ≈ 0%. Other cities in
other MFs do not change their policies. Mean public good growth in a is zero so that a will experience
no in-migration according to the model equations. City j experiences a 10pp growth in public services
in excess of the zero mean MF growth, and will experience a 0.7pp population growth. This represents
in-migration of 7 additional residents coming from out-migrationfrom other cities of a for an initial
investment of e940,000 and an increase of e154,000 in yearly services.
Figure 5 shows how housing consumption per capita and wages evolve around the subsidy shock.
Pre-trends are flat and not significantly different from zero in all panels. They make an even stronger
case for investment subsidies as exogenous shocks to local public good supply. None of the endoge-
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nous outcomes – public goods, population, housing consumption and wages – exhibit pre-shock dy-
namics correlated with shock intensity. Panels A offers evidence that subsidy shocks are not correlated
with increasing or decreasing pressure in local housing markets. Furthermore, we find that per capita
housing consumption, which subsumes house prices and residence taxes responses, is not affected by
the subsidy shocks. Panel B gives comfort that public investment shocks were not driven by favourable
or unfavourable trends in local productivity. Wages seem to be unaffected by subsidy shocks. The
distance window we consider might be too small to dissipate frictions in wage adjustments though22.
Within-MF subsidy shocks hence seem to induce migration responses through changes in local public
goods that do not capture significant changes in other endogenous city characteristics.
Table 2 reports alternative estimates without the different control variables. Our preferred estimates
in column (3) correspond to the endpoints of Figures 3, 4 and 5. They are largely unaffected when we
experiment with different specifications.
Between-MF behavioural responses We now investigate how MF-level changes in investment subsi-
dies affect changes in MF-level economic outcomes. Figure 6 is the symmetric of Figure 3 and shows
the first stage of our between-MF regressions. Public good cumulative growth is not significantly dif-
ferent from zero before the shock but it adjusts sharply after the shock. A 1% increase in the subsidy
stock leads to a 0.416% increase in the public good index after five years. All changes are relative to
mean regional changes taking the geometric average across each municipal federation as the new level
of observation. This effect is significant at the 1% level.
Figure 7 shows that MFs which received higher subsidy shocks also experienced relatively higher
in-migration. A 1% relative shock leads to a 0.152% relative population increase after five years. This
effect is significant at the 1% level. It represents a population elasticity with respect to public goods of
approximately 0.366 that is, a 10pp increase in public spending in excess of regional public spending
growth is met with a subsequent 3.66pp excess population growth. This estimate is roughly five times
higher than the point estimate of within-MF regressions. As outlined in our theoretical framework, a
candidate mechanism to explain this discrepancy is the presence of cross-boundary spillovers. Indeed,
in the polar case of full spillovers, changes in city local public goods relative to mean changes in the MF
should not affect within-MF migration. However, changes between MFs would still affect migration
decisions as we assume spillovers abruptly die out at the MF frontier.
22We also abstract from the possibility that agents commute to neighbor cities to work, which would dilute effects on
wages even further.
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Again it is useful to illustrate the intensity of migration responses between municipal federations.
Consider the same setting as the above example, but this time assume that all cities of a increase
their investment and yearly expenditure by 10%, that is invest e940,000 in durable infrastructure and
commit to increase yearly expenditure by e154,000. All other cities in all other municipal federations
decrease them by 10%/1266 ≈ 0%. Cities of a experience a mean 10pp growth in public services in
excess of the zero mean growth, and will experience a mean 3.66pp population growth. This represents
in-migration of 37 additional residents coming to each city of a from out-migration from other federations
for an initial investment of e940,000 and an increase of e154,000 in yearly services.
Figure 8 suggests that this reduced-form elasticity differs from the micro (i.e. absent general equi-
librium adjustments) migration responses to public good changes since it does not hold constant ad-
justments in other local amenities. Panel A shows again that subsidies were not awarded according
to local trends in housing supply determinants. However, consumable housing per capita decreases
in equilibrium in response to migration pressure and increasing marginal housing supply costs with a
reduced-form elasticity of housing per capita with respect to public goods of -0.07. This also contrasts
with our within-MF analysis. Panel B shows again that local productivity dynamics are not correlated
with subsidy shocks. However, we find this time that wages are affected by local public goods. This
result suggests that local public investment is also shifting labor demand upwards by boosting local
productivity. This is further evidenced by Panel C. We report the cumulative elasticities of the (geo-
metric) average number of businesses with respect to the subsidy stock. Contrasting this result with
the absence of within-MF wage variation hints at the presence of production spillovers or commuting
within municipal federations. In any case, these effects are fully captured by the residential wage
variation and won’t bias our spillover estimates as long as we separately instrument wage changes.
Overall these results are consistent with weaker public good spillovers between municipal federa-
tions than within. Table 3 reports alternative estimates where we let the fixed effect in the levels be at
the national or county level i.e. where we divide each observation by the national or county geometric
mean instead of the regional mean. They are largely unaffected when we experiment with different
specifications. While the migration response seems to be smaller when absorbing county fixed effects
instead of national or regional ones, it mirrors a weaker first stage intensity so that the reduced-form
elasticities are comparable. Our preferred estimates in column (2) correspond to the endpoints of
Figures 6, 7 and 8.
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Housing supply and price capitalization Figure 9 and 10 report the results of our housing supply
regressions and shows how total m2 housing consumption and house prices (in e/m2) are affected by
our instruments. Panel A of Figure 9 reports estimates for housing consumption changes conditional
on municipal federation. A 1% increase in the subsidy stock relative to the MF average increase is met
with a 0.020% relative increase in total consumed m2 by 20-65 residents after five years. This estimate
is significant at the 1% level. Panel B shows house price capitalization estimate: a 1% increase in the
subsidy stock is met with an insignificant 0.016% increase in house prices after five years.
Panel A of Figure 10 reports estimates for housing consumption changes conditional on region. A
1% increase in the subsidy stock relative to the regional average increase is met with a 0.132% relative
increase in total consumed m2 by 20-65 residents after five years. This estimate is significant at the
1% level. Panel B again shows house price capitalization estimate. This time, a 1% increase in the
subsidy stock is met with an 0.239% increase in house prices after five years significant a 1%. Panel
B hence offers comfort in our interpretation of subsidy shocks as instrumenting additional public
good amenities that are positively valued by residents. Most importantly, significant house price
capitalization in the between-MF regressions and not in the within-MF regressions is consistent with
the presence of strong within-MF spillovers. It is worth noting that house price response is an order of
magnitude larger than the per capita housing drop in the between-MF case. We argue that house price
responses are more representative of the longer-term adjustment in rental prices facing newcomers as
short- to medium-term housing per capita responses might be dampened by adjustment frictions. We
will use house prices in our GMM to estimate the model’s parameters.
Table 4 reports alternative estimates. Our preferred estimates in column (3) correspond to the end-
points of Figure 9 and 10. They are robust to different specifications.
Overall, these reduced-form results show that households value local public goods as evidenced by
migration responses and capitalization in house prices. They also highlight, in line with the theoret-
ical framework, that the intensity of cross-boundary spillovers influences the magnitude of migration
responses to local public good supply shocks.
4.5 Robustness Checks
We run a series of robustness checks investigating whether the observed migration patterns could be
driven by mechanisms other than responses to changes in positively valued public goods.
A first concern is that changes in local public spending may not be valued by residents in them-
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selves, but may be correlated with changes in housing supply determinants through EC. This would be
the case if public good shocks were land improvements – new roads, pathways – of no intrinsic value
but destined to welcome social housing units or private housing developments following changes in
land use regulation. Residents would migrate towards cities experiencing positive housing supply
shocks because of lower posted rents. More generally, if our subsidy shocks are correlated with shocks
in the determinants of housing supply it may bias the interpretation of our estimates. As a first test
to alleviate this concern, we can look back at the rents results of Figure 10. A positive housing sup-
ply shock would have a negative effect on rents. Our results show the exact opposite suggesting that
people indeed value local public goods beyond any correlated shift in the housing supply curve. A
second test is to look at how the dwelling vacancy rate evolves around the subsidy shock. A third test
is to look directly at the presence of housing supply shocks by looking at changes in the success rate
of building permit applications.
A second concern is that migration responses may entirely be driven by the inflow of public em-
ployees necessary to operate the new facilities or services financed by the subsidy shocks. Indeed, our
model does not account for public employment. Public goods may be of little value in themselves,
but workers may react to public labor demand shocks that would increase wages. It is not concep-
tually a problem as we could have modelled public good provision as taking public employees as
input. The identification of the partial effect of public good supply would still be achieved provided
that we separately instrument changes in local wages in the GMM procedure. We nevertheless as-
sess the importance of this channel and show evidence that the public employment effect is marginal.
We look at how the share of public employees in the population – crudely measured as public staff
payroll divided by total local payroll – evolves around subsidy shocks. Combining this estimate with
total population responses and the pre-shock shares of public employees, we conclude that observed
behavioral responses coming from public employment only explain approximately 12% of total 20-65
population response (see derivations in appendix B).
4.6 Towards Moment Conditions
We provide further evidence on the absence of pre-trends by looking at the non-parametric relationship
between treatment intensity and outcome changes before and after the subsidy shocks. We run kernel
regression where the dependent variable is alternatively ∆ ln Gj,−6,−2, ∆ ln Gj,−2,4, ∆ ln N j,−6,−2 and
∆ ln N j,−2,4. The explanatory variables are the residuals obtained from a first-step regression of the
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subsidy shock ∆ ln Sj,−1,0 on 1999 city density and population23. Figure 11 presents the results.
In panel A the dependent variable is ∆ ln G−6,−2, in panel C ∆ ln N−6,−2. Panels A and C show
again that the average relationship between treatment and outcome growth is close to zero before
treatment. In addition, they offer evidence that city expected outcomes grow at the same rate as their
MF geometric average conditional on treatment intensity. This richer mean-independence setting will
be central to our GMM analysis. The identification assumption will be that outcome relative growth
be zero in expectation in different cells of treatment intensity which is more demanding than it be
uncorrelated with treatment as evidenced in section 4.4. Creating flexible indicators for treatment
intensity will increase the precision of our estimates and let estimation be over-identified.
In panel B and D the dependent variables are ∆ ln Gj,−2,4 and ∆ ln N j,−2,4. They offer reassurance
that the average effects reported in the Figures of section 4.4 are not driven by outliers. Public good
and migration responses are visible across the full distribution of subsidy shocks.
Figure 12 provides similar evidence on ∆ ln ÙGa and ∆ ln ÙNa. Panels A and C show again the absence
of correlation between treatment and pre-treatment normalized outcome growth. They similarly show
that pre-shock expected outcome growth is not significantly different from zero conditional on treat-
ment intensity. Panels B and D offer additional evidence that responses to the treatment are observed
all along the distribution of treatment intensity. Finally, Figure 13 similarly shows that house prices
∆ lnÛra evolve in a similar fashion in different cells of treatment intensity in pre-shock periods and that
the price response is coming from the full range of treatment values.
5 Structural Estimation
In this section we build on the reduced-form results to develop moment conditions for our GMM
estimation. We present our structural estimates and compare them to the existing literature.
23The fitted values and confidence bands are computed from running kernel regressions of the dependent variable on
these initial residuals and on 1000 additional samples of residuals. We generate synthetic residuals using the wild cluster
bootstrap procedure proposed in Cameron et al. (2008). We assume that errors are correlated within clusters which we take
to be counties. Each cluster randomly draws a +1/-1 coefficient with probability 0.5 and all residuals of a same cluster
are multiplied by the same coefficient. These synthetic residuals are then added back to the original fitted values. We run
the first-step regression again on this pseudo-sample and store the coefficient estimates. We do this 1000 times. We then
generate 1000 pseudo-samples of residuals by fitting each saved model on the original data and saving the residuals. The
graphs report the pivotal bootstrap confidence band and the bias-corrected fitted values.
28
5.1 Moment Conditions
Section 4.6 illustrated that our candidate instruments were likely to satisfy mean-independence condi-
tions of the form
E[∆ ln Y |∆ ln S] = 0
for all endogenous outcomes Y before shock years. Looking back at equations (19) and (21), notice
that unobserved residuals are linear combinations of endogenous outcomes. As such, they are likely
to satisfy mean-independence conditions
E[∆ ln E |∆ ln S] = 0
in pre-shock periods. Using a DiD type argument, we extrapolate these mean-independence conditions
to post-shock periods. They are richer than the usual conditions of zero correlation between instrument
and endogenous outcomes of the form E[∆ ln E × ∆ ln S] = 0. Indeed, with mean-independence of the
unobserved fundamentals with respect to the original instrument, any function of ∆ ln S may be used
as an additional instrument (see Wooldridge (2010)).
We use this property and apply it to a discrete number of indicator functions: we partition the
empirical distribution of ∆ ln S (or ∆ ln ÛS) into subintervals of equal range. We define IWm (respectively
IBm) the indicator function equal to one if ∆ ln S belongs to the subinterval m of ∆ ln S (resp. ∆ ln ÛS)
partition. Hence our moment conditions are:
E
ñ
∆ ln EAj × I
W
m
ô
= 0 for all m ∈ {1, ..., M}
E
ñ
∆ ln EAj × ∆ ln Sj
ô
= 0
(28)
using the within-MF expression of residential residuals (19) and
E
ñ
∆ ln ÊAa × IBm
ô
= 0 for all m ∈ {1, ..., M}
E
ñ
∆ ln ÊAa × ∆ lnıSaô = 0 (29)
using the between-MF expression of residential residuals (21). To make sure that the arbitrarily
chosen number of subintervals does not affect our results, we try different specifications with different
numbers of IV subintervals.
Our moment conditions impose that normalized investment-targeted subsidies are not correlated
with changes in unobserved fundamentals. All outcome changes plugged in (28) and (29) are the
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8-year relative cumulative growths between year −4 and year 4 around the 2007, 2009 and 2010 sub-
sidy shocks. These moment conditions exploit the differentiated variation of the observed economic
outcomes in different treatment cells. The identifying assumption is that the intensity of the subsidy
shock is uncorrelated with city or MF changes in unobserved residential amenities, housing supply
determinants or local productivity prior to the shock. Based on the DiD results of section 4.4 and their
decomposition in section 4.6, we argue that variation in our raw IV and indicator variables {Imk , IBm} is
a plausibly exogenous source of variation in public good supply.
Let us clarify the economics behind the identification strategy. Ideally, we would interact our shocks
with measures of local housing supply elasticity as in Diamond (2016). Intuitively, cities with inelastic
housing supply at the high end of our public good shocks will see house prices go up without much
additional in-migration. However, large subsidy receivers with a more elastic housing supply will
experience larger in-migration and lower price increase. These different responses would allow us
to separately identify our parameters. Unfortunately, we do not observe housing supply elasticities.
However, this data limitation is immaterial as long as our treatment cells pick up variation in housing
supply elasticity without picking up differential city dynamics.
Finally, we estimate an “average” housing supply elasticity using residuals equation (23)
E
ñ
∆ ln ÊCa × ∆ lnıSaô = 0 (30)
We simultaneously estimate the model’s parameters using a two-step non-linear GMM procedure.
As shown in section 3.8, our transformed residuals are uniquely identified conditional on parameters
and changes in endogenous variables. The identification of the model’s parameters then hinges on the
uniqueness of a global minimum in the GMM minimization procedure, which is achieved in practice24.
The estimation requires a sufficient number of IV cells to pick up the underlying variation in
housing supply elasticity. Indeed, it is unlikely that housing supply elasticity systematically differs
between below-median and above-median cities for instance. Hence, too few cells yield imprecise
estimates with much variation between specifications. We pick the lower bound number of cells to be
that beyond which parameter estimation is stabilized. We report parameter estimates for specifications
varying between 40 and 60 cells for each calibrated value of the housing consumption share.
We carry out the GMM estimation using our preferred specification i.e. after our IV has been
flexibly residualized with respect to baseline 1999 density, population and past shocks for within-a
24Parameters are hence uniquely identified even if the model has several equilibria. See Ahlfeldt et al. (2015) for a more
detailed discussion of this point.
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and between-a specifications. As in section 4.6, bias-corrected point estimates and standard errors are
computed from a wild cluster bootstrap procedure where we let the errors be arbitrarily correlated
within counties and independent between counties.
5.2 Estimation Results
We report estimates of our structural parameters for different calibrated values of the housing con-
sumption share α. Calibrating the consumption share allows us to improve the robustness of our
estimates given the multiplicative fashion in which it interacts with other parameters. Tables 5, 6, 7
and 8 report estimates of the model’s parameters for α ∈ {0.25, 0.30, 0.35, 0.40}.
We estimate a taste parameter for public services φ that varies between 0.114 and 0.252 according
to the calibrated housing share. For a given value of α, our estimate is robust across specifications of
IV cells. Given the Cobb-Douglas specification of preferences, the interpretation is that communities
spend between 11% and 25% of their total resources on public services. This estimate is typically
increasing with the calibrated α. Indeed, a higher taste for public services is needed to compensate for
given house price changes when the taste for housing is higher, holding constant migration and public
good changes. Parameter φ is the only parameter that is directly comparable with estimates from the
existing literature, which we report in Table 9. Our estimates fall in the range of existing estimates.
Estimates for inverse household mobility σ lie between 0.03 and 0.14. These estimates are much
lower than those found for instance in Serrato and Wingender (2011) or Diamond (2016). First, notice
that the size of the considered French jurisdictions is much smaller than the geographic unit of these
studies, typically the MSA. Mobility between locations is then expected to be higher. Second, it is in-
teresting to note that given modelling assumptions, parameter σ is isomorphic to any combination of
parameters σ− κ̃ where κ̃ would capture positive agglomeration externalities from increased density
beyond those transiting through increased public goods and potential changes in wages. Hence, our
estimated σ is actually capturing mobility frictions net of all non-public and non-productive agglom-
eration effects, e.g. endogenous residential amenities such as in Diamond (2016).
We find substantial public good spillovers between cities of a same municipal federation. Estimates
for δ all lie between 0 and 0.08. While they are typically decreasing with the calibrated α, the rela-
tionship is not trivial. When taste for housing increases, lower benefit spillovers are needed to explain
observed house price increases i.e. location must matter for the enjoyment of public goods. However,
higher congestion spillovers can also explain observed price changes, because additional congestion
brought by new residents matters less than congestion caused by residents of neighboring cities. Our
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estimates show that the second effect prevails.
Recall that δ = 0 means full spillovers within a municipal federation, while δ = 1 means no
spillovers. In line with our previous empirical evidence, our estimates suggest that spillovers are very
strong in the examined French setting, with public services of a city’s MF neighbors accounting for
between 89% and 96% of total public goods benefiting its residents25. These large estimates may seem
unsurprising since the large of number of French cities make it likely that travel distances between
them are small.
Our estimates for public good congestion are the least robust to cell number specification. However,
we find significant estimates for κφ that are typically below estimates for φ. This points to local public
services being not fully rival or subject to economies of scale, and to the existence of other sources of
local inefficiencies due to fiscal agglomeration effects. Indeed, these estimates suggest that the cost of
providing public services increases less than one for one with population, rendering denser cities more
attractive from a public amenity perspective.
6 Welfare Implications
Our empirical analysis documented strong public good spillovers across city borders. The decentral-
ized provision of public services is likely to be sub-optimally low i.e. there may be welfare gains from
coordination. While the current subsidies from counties, regions and the central government may
carry some pigovian flavour, it is unlikely that they fully tackle spillover inefficiency. In this section
we simulate the welfare impact of an administrative reform merging all jurisdictions belonging to a
same municipal federation. As mentioned in section 2, these groupings were historically introduced
precisely to deal with spillovers and economies of scale. However, member cities still maintained a
high degree of independence and it is a natural check to investigate whether this residual autonomy is
at the root of significant dead-weight loss.
To ensure tractability of the equilibrium, we simplify the model. Motivated by the suppression of
the French local business tax in 2011, we assume that local revenue only comes from the residence
tax. We compare equilibrium situations pre- and post- merger. In both hypothetical situations, public
subsidies are absent. While this setting does not enable us to evaluate a reform that departs from the
current observed situation, it helps highlighting the magnitude of potential welfare gains.
25The weight put on own public services is δ + 1|a| (1− δ) where |a| is the number of member cities in the MF. We take the
mean number of member cities i.e. 27 for this computation.
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This version of the model has a unique and tractable equilibrium given parameters {α, κ, σ, φ, δ, η}
and geographic fundamentals {EAj , ECj , θYj }. We back out these fundamentals from (1) equilibrium
endogenous variables of the model – with subsidies – that we observe as econometricians, and (2)
parameters that we have estimated or calibrated from the literature. In what follows, we assume that
these same fundamentals keep defining the geography of a model in which subsidies are absent.
Prior to the reform, residents vote for public goods as in section 3.6 absent subsidies and busi-
ness taxation. They choose the housing tax rate τhj and the level of public good Gj that maximize vj
under the budget constraint rjNjhjτhj = Gj. Following the merger, residents vote for a new level of
public spending pooling tax bases of all former member cities. To keep welfare comparable between
pre- and post-reform situations, we assume that prior jurisdiction blocks still exist for the purpose of
labor and housing markets. The only change is the degree of cooperation in the provision of local
public services, now decided at the a level for all former jurisdictions of a. Residents hence choose a
housing tax τha and a level of public good Ga that maximizes vj for j in a under the budget constraint
Ga =
∑
j′∈a rj′Nj′hj′τha 26. We assume that the total amount of local public services is then allocated to all
cities of a in proportion to their pre-reform share of the total quantity of public good in the municipal
federation. This allocation rule allows us to center our welfare analysis on efficiency gains and neutral-
izes the redistributive channel that would be present with, say, an egalitarian allocation. Our analysis
would also work with alternative allocation rules but the welfare channels would be more intricate.
We note Xo all equilibrium variables currently observed as a result of the model with subsidies. In
the model without public subsidies, we call Xn the pre-reform equilibrium variables and Xm the post-
reform equilibrium variables. Absent subsidies, local public good supply before the reform equals
1 + τnj = 1 +
φ(δ + 1−δ|aj| )
(1− φ)α
Gnj
î
1 + τnj
ó
=
ϕϕ(1− ϕ)1−ϕ
ζ ϕ
τnj N
n
j w
n
j α(1− τw)
(31)
After the merger, local public good supply is
1 + τma = 1 +
φ
(1− φ)α
Gmj =
ϕϕ(1− ϕ)1−ϕ
ζϕ
Gnj∑
j′∈aj G
n
j′
∑
j′∈aj
τmj′
1 + τmj′
Nmj′ wj′α(1− τw)
(32)
Using backed out fundamentals, we can express all endogenous variables in these two simulated
26The result of this optimization problem is the same for any city j in a, see Appendix D.
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cases as functions of 2014 observables. We assume that social welfare is defined as 27
W = E
î
max
j
ln U(i, j)
ó
(33)
Because idiosyncratic preferences are distributed Extreme Value Type-I, the welfare change associated
with the reform equals
∆W = Wm −Wn
= σ ln
Ç∑
j e
vmj /σ∑
j e
vnj /σ
å (34)
In the model, utility is homogeneous to euros so we interpret these welfare changes as percentage
changes of a money metric. All detailed equations are given in Appendix D.
In our baseline scenario, we simulate the welfare change from the reform by using α = 0.3 for the
housing consumption share and η = 0.2 for the housing supply elasticity that we force to be common
across locations. These two values correspond to the literature’s central estimates for France (see Table
9). For each parameter of {κ, σ, φ, δ}, we use its average estimation across specifications of section 5.
Because this simulation is based on estimated parameters and fundamentals, we report the associated
Monte-Carlo standard errors that we compute using the parameters’ estimated variance-covariance
structure.
In our central specification, we estimate that a reform that would fully merge cities at the existing
federation level would increase welfare by 60%. This welfare gain is significant at the 1% level. Tables
10 and 11 report welfare change estimates for alternative values of η and α. They are largely robust
across calibration for η. However they vary between 40% and 137% when we plug alternative housing
consumption shares holding η = 0.20. This is expected as our GMM estimates for spillovers and taste
for public services are increasing with the calibrated α, which makes welfare gains from a coordination
reform increasing with α.
This strong result is unsurprising given our spillover estimates, but should be interpreted as an
upper bound. First, it is obtained in a hypothetical context without public subsidies. Because current
subsidies may already be correcting some of the externalities, we expect that the welfare gains from
a reform departing from the current situation and holding subsidies constant would be smaller. We
also emphasize that by abstracting from the political dead-weight loss that may arise under a more
centralized regime, our analysis only investigated one side of the centralization efficiency trade-off.
27The choice of a utilitarian welfare criterion is akin to considering that policy choices are made behind the “veil of
ignorance”. Increasing welfare is then equivalent to increasing the expected utility of ex-ante homogeneous agents. Evaluating
the proposed reform through the lens of an ex-post Pareto criterion will likely change its desirability.
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More work is needed to finely assess how much the inability to tailor policies to local needs as well as
other potential political frictions would decrease overall welfare gains.
7 Conclusion
This paper develops a simple yet flexible framework to test for potential welfare gains from centraliza-
tion of public goods provision. We first build a spatial equilibrium model of cities with endogenous
public goods. The binary structure for spillover spatial decay makes it easily amenable to empirical
analysis. Our model shows how one can exploit differential behavioral responses to shocks in local
public goods at different geographic levels to uncover the intensity of local spillovers.
We then bring new insights on spatial spillovers in the fragmented French institutional context by
providing reduced-form evidence of migration and house price responses to changes in local public
goods. We then estimate our model with GMM and document substantial public good spillovers,
corroborating our reduced-form evidence. A city’s neighbors’ public goods account for 89-96% of total
public goods benefiting its residents.
In a final exercise, we simulate the effect of a reform redefining city administrative boundaries
in a simpler version of our model. Although we do not estimate the cost of centralization, our re-
sults suggest that increased coordination in the provision of public services may substantially improve
welfare.
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Table 1: Descriptive Statistics on Cities
Variable Mean St. Dev.
Current spendinga 1 517 088 23 022 598
Current spending per adultb 1 111 1 786
Investment stocka 9 383 611 98 714 400
Investment stock per adultb 13 481 24 130
Populationc 1 746 14 614
Population 20-65d 994 4 573
Housing price per square metere 1 570 978
Net income per adultd 10 848 3 614
Housing service per cityd 16 247 83 086
Housing surface per adultd 39 6
Note: This table gives the averages and standard deviations across cities for some of section 4 constructed variables in 2009
or the closest available year.
a2009 City accounts, author’s calculations
b2009 City accounts, 2008 Census data, author’s calculations
b2009 City accounts, 2009 FILOCOM, author’s calculations
d2009 FILOCOM, author’s calculations
c2008 Census data, author’s calculations
e2008 Notaries databases, author’s calculations
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Table 2: Within-MF Sensitivity Analysis
(1) (2) (3)
∆ ln Gj ∆ ln Gj ∆ ln Gj
∆ ln Sj
0.363∗∗∗
(0.009)
0.372∗∗∗
(0.009)
0.369∗∗∗
(0.009)
∆ ln N j ∆ ln N j ∆ ln N j
∆ ln Sj
0.033∗∗∗
(0.007)
0.032∗∗∗
(0.008)
0.026∗∗∗
(0.008)
∆ ln wj ∆ ln wj ∆ ln wj
∆ ln Sj
0.002
(0.003)
0.003
(0.003)
0.001
(0.003)
∆ ln hj ∆ ln hj ∆ ln hj
∆ ln Sj
−0.006
(0.003)
−0.006
(0.004)
−0.007
(0.004)
∆ ln T j ∆ ln T j ∆ ln T j
∆ ln Sj
0.002
(0.003)
0.002
(0.003)
0.001
(0.003)
Lag ∆ ln Sj Yes Yes
Baseline Controls Yes
Observations 99,593 99,593 99,593
Note: This Table reports estimates for βd=4 i.e. the effect of the shock happening in d = 0 on cumulative outcome growth
between d = −6 and d = 4. Lag shocks include all past shocks up to d = −1. We flexibly control for baseline 1999 city
population and density. Standard errors are clustered at the MF level. ∗ significant at 10%; ∗∗ significant at 5%; ∗∗∗ significant
at 1%.
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Table 3: Between-MF Sensitivity Analysis
(1) (2) (3)
∆ ln “Ga ∆ ln “Ga ∆ ln “Ga
∆ ln Ŝa
0.258∗∗∗
(0.048)
0.416∗∗∗
(0.055)
0.466∗∗∗
(0.055)
∆ ln “Na ∆ ln “Na ∆ ln “Na
∆ ln Ŝa
0.094∗∗
(0.038)
0.152∗∗∗
(0.042)
0.148∗∗∗
(0.045)
∆ ln “wa ∆ ln “wa ∆ ln “wa
∆ ln Ŝa
0.008
(0.017)
0.055∗∗∗
(0.019)
0.050∗∗
(0.020)
∆ ln ĥa ∆ ln ĥa ∆ ln ĥa
∆ ln Ŝa
−0.036∗∗
(0.016)
−0.031
(0.018)
−0.030
(0.019)
∆ ln “Ta ∆ ln “Ta ∆ ln “Ta
∆ ln Ŝa
−0.017
(0.015)
−0.019
(0.016)
−0.023
(0.016)
Lag ∆ ln Ŝa Yes Yes Yes
Baseline Controls Yes Yes Yes
Time FE X County Region Nation
Observations 5,428 5,428 5,428
Note: This Table reports estimates for βd=4 i.e. the effect of the shock happening in d = 0 on cumulative outcome growth
between d = −6 and d = 4. Lag shocks include all past shocks up to d = −1. We flexibly control for baseline 1999 city
population and density. In the model, time fixed effects in the residuals are assumed to be uniform at the national level
hence the division of endogenous variables by their national geometric mean. Here, we allow for division by either national,
regional of county geometric mean to account for year, year X region or year X county fixed effects in the structural residuals.
Standard errors are clustered at the MF level. ∗ significant at 10%; ∗∗ significant at 5%; ∗∗∗ significant at 1%.
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Table 4: Housing Supply Sensitivity Analysis
(1) (2) (3)
∆ ln H j ∆ ln H j ∆ ln H j
∆ ln Sj
0.027∗∗∗
(0.007)
0.026∗∗∗
(0.007)
0.020∗∗∗
(0.007)
∆ ln rj ∆ ln rj ∆ ln rj
∆ ln Sj
−0.026
(0.025)
0.015
(0.017)
0.016
(0.017)
Lag ∆ ln Sj Yes Yes
Baseline Controls Yes
Observations
Housing 99,593 99,593 99,593
Prices 99,593 99,593 99,593
∆ ln “Ha ∆ ln “Ha ∆ ln “Ha
∆ ln Ŝa
0.073∗∗
(0.035)
0.125∗∗∗
(0.039)
0.132∗∗∗
(0.041)
∆ ln r̂a ∆ ln r̂a ∆ ln r̂a
∆ ln Ŝa
0.173∗∗
(0.072)
0.246∗∗∗
(0.073)
0.239∗∗∗
(0.075)
Lag ∆ ln Ŝa Yes Yes Yes
Baseline Controls Yes Yes Yes
Time FE X County Region Nation
Observations 5,428 5,428 5,428
Note: This Table reports estimates for βd=4 i.e. the effect of the shock happening in d = 0 on cumulative outcome growth
between d = −6 and d = 4. Lag shocks include all past shocks up to d = −2. Controls include baseline 1999 city population
and density. Standard errors are clustered at the MF level. ∗ significant at 10%; ∗∗ significant at 5%; ∗∗∗ significant at 1%.
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Table 5: Structural parameters for α = 0.25
# IV Cells 40 42 44 46 48 50 52 54 56 58 60
Spillovers (δ) 0.077 0.051 0.071 0.024 0.029 0.034 0.063 0.056 0.031 0.063 0.042
0.011 0.005 0.008 0.009 0.012 0.014 0.007 0.007 0.017 0.007 0.009
PG Taste (φ) 0.114 0.150 0.139 0.142 0.147 0.138 0.155 0.175 0.153 0.163 0.148
0.007 0.005 0.005 0.004 0.009 0.012 0.006 0.007 0.009 0.012 0.007
Mobility (σ) 0.113 0.103 0.142 0.069 0.065 0.079 0.125 0.124 0.080 0.118 0.099
0.009 0.011 0.006 0.008 0.014 0.012 0.007 0.005 0.013 0.006 0.004
PG Congestion (κφ) 0.056 0.113 0.065 0.134 0.166 0.118 0.094 0.131 0.174 0.144 0.061
0.013 0.021 0.012 0.012 0.022 0.027 0.017 0.010 0.024 0.016 0.038
Note: This Table reports our structural parameters estimation for α = 0.25. Standard errors are computed from a wild cluster
bootstrap procedure based on 1, 000 replications.
Table 6: Structural parameters for α = 0.30
# IV Cells 40 42 44 46 48 50 52 54 56 58 60
Spillovers (δ) 0.073 0.037 0.053 0.016 0.028 0.031 0.056 0.041 0.015 0.052 0.035
0.009 0.005 0.004 0.007 0.013 0.009 0.008 0.004 0.014 0.008 0.006
PG Taste (φ) 0.132 0.178 0.162 0.165 0.165 0.154 0.173 0.194 0.183 0.190 0.168
0.004 0.009 0.009 0.005 0.007 0.011 0.009 0.007 0.012 0.012 0.007
Mobility (σ) 0.104 0.083 0.112 0.048 0.046 0.069 0.104 0.098 0.067 0.105 0.080
0.007 0.013 0.006 0.008 0.013 0.009 0.009 0.007 0.016 0.010 0.006
PG Congestion (κφ) 0.063 0.152 0.100 0.160 0.168 0.138 0.109 0.166 0.197 0.161 0.064
0.010 0.023 0.013 0.018 0.023 0.025 0.013 0.011 0.021 0.024 0.024
Note: This Table reports our structural parameters estimation for α = 0.30. Standard errors are computed from a wild cluster
bootstrap procedure based on 1, 000 replications.
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Table 7: Structural parameters for α = 0.35
# IV Cells 40 42 44 46 48 50 52 54 56 58 60
Spillovers (δ) 0.047 0.027 0.043 0.000 -.000 0.025 0.037 0.040 0.012 0.025 0.015
0.008 0.005 0.005 0.008 0.007 0.006 0.006 0.010 0.007 0.006 0.010
PG Taste (φ) 0.155 0.188 0.179 0.200 0.196 0.177 0.194 0.211 0.193 0.219 0.188
0.009 0.010 0.005 0.007 0.005 0.015 0.006 0.013 0.010 0.008 0.007
Mobility (σ) 0.092 0.071 0.088 0.031 0.014 0.063 0.092 0.086 0.045 0.071 0.065
0.010 0.010 0.006 0.011 0.013 0.007 0.006 0.011 0.008 0.008 0.005
PG Congestion (κφ) 0.092 0.156 0.123 0.200 0.225 0.176 0.154 0.179 0.229 0.187 0.142
0.023 0.020 0.017 0.013 0.009 0.043 0.019 0.019 0.015 0.012 0.033
Note: This Table reports our structural parameters estimation for α = 0.35. Standard errors are computed from a wild cluster
bootstrap procedure based on 1, 000 replications.
Table 8: Structural parameters for α = 0.40
# IV Cells 40 42 44 46 48 50 52 54 56 58 60
Spillovers (δ) 0.035 0.019 0.037 0.007 -.001 0.014 0.025 0.027 0.017 0.023 0.017
0.005 0.005 0.007 0.004 0.004 0.008 0.003 0.009 0.008 0.007 0.004
PG Taste (φ) 0.181 0.221 0.183 0.214 0.221 0.205 0.230 0.254 0.232 0.252 0.228
0.009 0.008 0.009 0.006 0.006 0.021 0.009 0.010 0.012 0.012 0.007
Mobility (σ) 0.070 0.050 0.074 0.033 -.003 0.046 0.078 0.063 0.042 0.063 0.051
0.007 0.014 0.005 0.007 0.012 0.015 0.005 0.008 0.015 0.011 0.010
PG Congestion (κφ) 0.126 0.217 0.140 0.230 0.252 0.156 0.193 0.226 0.262 0.171 0.163
0.017 0.030 0.022 0.011 0.027 0.041 0.016 0.013 0.017 0.027 0.033
Note: This Table reports our structural parameters estimation for α = 0.40. Standard errors are computed from a wild cluster
bootstrap procedure based on 1, 000 replications.
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Table 9: Structural Parameters Calibration and Estimation
Structural parameters Values from literature Estimation/calibration
α
Diamond (2016)a 43% for US non college workers and 46% for US college workers
from literature
Combes et al. (2018)e:0.314 for homeowners and 0.352 for renters, and more precisely
Paris Lyon, Lille, Marseille Pop > 200 000 Pop ≤ 200 000
homeowners 0.344 0.344 0.304 0.293
renters 0.369 0.367 0.382 0.285
φ
Fajgelbaum et al. (2015): on US data
Serrato and Wingender (2011)b: [0.391,0.502] for US non college workers and [0.228,0.267] for US college workers
Fajgelbaum et al. (2015)c : [0.11,0.23]
Serrato and Wingender (2016)d:0.26
Diamond (2016)a : 0.03 for US non college workers, 0.32 for US college workers
σ
Serrato and Wingender (2011)b: US non college workers [0.342, 0.399] and for US college workers [0.350, 0.376]
range from literature
Diamond (2016)a: US non college workers 0.24 and US college workers0.47
η
Diamond (2016)a: 0.21 with a standard deviation of 0.22
(1) GMM estimation
Serrato and Wingender (2011)b: [0.407,0.813]
France Combes et al. (2018)e: 0.208 with most alternative estimates being between 0.15 and 0.30
seminal work Saiz (2010) us data or (2) range from literature
ζ calibration with our data
ϕ calibration with our data
κ estimation with GMM
δ estimation with GMM
aα: the author uses US CEX survey data.
φ: for unskilled workers 1.012/2.116 = φ1−φ , for skilled workers. This is a structural parameter for valuation by workers of
all amenities compared to national good. It is not local public good specific. 0.274/4.026 = φ1−φ
σ We take σ as the inverse of the structural wage coefficient in the favorite specification (3) of the author. More precisely, it
gives for US non college workers 1/0.4026=0.24 and US college workers 1/2.116=0.47
η: inverse housing supply elasticity of 0.21 with standard deviation of 0.22
bη=0.813 when using housing prices, =0.407 when using rents. Author’s preferred specification is non linear.
cNo parameters for σ assume the distribution of idiosyncratic shocks to follow a Frechet distribution
dfrom Fajgelbaum et al. (2015) literature review on structural parameters. See their Table A.17.
eUse Family expenditure survey for α values
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Table 10: Welfare change estimation for α=0.30
η ∆W mean ∆W sd
0.15 60% 19%
0.20 63% 21%
0.25 66% 23%
Note: This Table reports the welfare impact of a merger of all French cities at the municipal federation level in our simplified
model version. Estimation for α = 0.30. Standard errors are computed based on 1000 Monte-Carlo simulations.
Table 11: Welfare change estimation for η = 0.20
α ∆W mean ∆W sd
0.25 40% 13%
0.30 63% 21%
0.35 100% 29%
0.40 137% 35%
Note: This Table reports the welfare impact of a merger of all French cities at the municipal federation level in our simplified
model version. Estimation for η = 0.20. Standard errors are computed based on 1000 Monte-Carlo simulations.
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Figure 1: Distribution of Subsidy Stock Yearly Growth
A. Relative to Mean National Change
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Note: These histograms plot the distribution of the yearly growth in normalized subsidy stocks pooling years 2007, 2009
and 2010. Panel A normalizes each city-level observation by the national geometric mean. Panel B normalizes each city-level
observation by the geometric mean of all cities belonging to the city’s MF. In each panel, top and bottom 1% observations are
censored for exposition purposes.
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Figure 2: Model Fit: G f vs Gs
Slope = .986 (.002)
R-squared = .91
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Note: This Figure shows the calibration exercise we carry out for our Cobb-Douglas modeling of how public services enter
utility.
48
Figure 3: Within-MF Public Good Changes
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Note: This graph plots the coefficients βd of section 4 regressions. It shows the effect of changes in a city’s subsidy stock in
year 0 on cumulative changes in local public good starting 6 years prior to the shock year. All changes are relative to mean
changes in the MF. Standard errors are clustered at the MF level. We report the 5% confidence bands.
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Figure 4: Within-MF Migration Response
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Note: This graph plots the coefficients βd of section 4 regressions. It shows the effect of changes in a city’s subsidy stock in
year 0 on cumulative changes in the number of residents aged 20-65 starting 6 years prior to the shock year. All changes are
relative to mean changes in the MF. Standard errors are clustered at the MF level. We report the 5% confidence bands.
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Figure 5: Within-MF Per Capita Housing and Wage
A. Per Capita Housing Consumption (in m2)
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Note: These graphs plot the coefficients βd of section 4 regressions. They show the effect of changes in a city’s subsidy stock
in year 0 on cumulative changes in per capita housing consumption, wages and house prices starting 6 years prior to the
shock year. All changes are relative to mean changes in the MF. Standard errors are clustered at the MF level. We report the
5% confidence bands.
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Figure 6: Between-MF Local Public Good Changes
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Note: This graph plots the coefficients βd of section 4 regressions. It shows the effect of changes in a MF subsidy stock in year
0 on cumulative changes in local public goods starting 6 years prior to the shock year. All changes are relative to regional
mean changes. Standard errors are clustered at the MF level. We report the 5% confidence bands.
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Figure 7: Between-MF Migration Response
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Note: This graph plots the coefficients βd of section 4 regressions. It shows the effect of changes in a MF subsidy stock in
year 0 on cumulative changes in population starting 6 years prior to the shock year. All changes are relative to regional mean
changes. Standard errors are clustered at the MF level. We report the 5% confidence bands.
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Figure 8: Between-MF Per Capita Housing and Wage
A. Per Capita Housing Consumption (in m2)
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C. Recorded Businesses
-.2
0
.2
.4
Cu
m
ul
at
iv
e 
El
as
tic
ity
-4 -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 4
Years from Subsidy Shock
Note: These graphs plot the coefficients βd of section 4 regressions. They show the effect of changes in a MF subsidy stock
in year 0 on cumulative changes in per capita housing consumption, wages and house prices starting 6 years prior to the
shock year. All changes are relative to regional mean changes. Standard errors are clustered at the MF level. We report the
5% confidence bands.
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Figure 9: Within-MF Housing Supply and House Prices
A. Total Housing Consumption (in m2)
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B. House Prices
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Note: These graphs plot the coefficients βd of section 4 regressions. They show the effect of changes in a city’s subsidy stock
in year 0 on cumulative changes in total m2 of housing consumed starting 6 years prior to the shock year. All changes are
relative to MF mean changes. Standard errors are clustered at the MF level. We report the 5% confidence bands.
Figure 10: Between-MF Housing Supply and House Prices
A. Total Housing Consumption (in m2)
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B. House Prices
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Note: These graphs plot the coefficients βd of section 4 regressions. They show the effect of changes in a city’s subsidy stock
in year 0 on cumulative changes in total m2 of housing consumed starting 6 years prior to the shock year. All changes are
relative to regional mean chang. Standard errors are clustered at the MF level. We report the 5% confidence bands.
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Figure 11: Kernel Regressions: Within-MF Changes
A. G 4-year Relative Growth Pre-Shock
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B. G 6-year Relative Growth Post-shock
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C. N 4-year Relative Growth Pre-Shock
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D. N 6-year Relative Growth Post-Shock
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Note: This Figure shows the outcomes of non-parametric regressions where the explanatory variable is the within-MF relative
subsidy shock. Dependent and explanatory variables are first residualized with respect to bins of fixed 1999 characteristics
and lagged shocks. Bias-corrected fitted values and 1% confidence band are computed based on 1000 bootstrap replications.
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Figure 12: Kernel Regressions: Between-MF Changes (1/3)
A. G 4-year Relative Growth Pre-Shock
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B. G 6-year Relative Growth Post-shock
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Note: This Figure shows the outcomes of non-parametric regressions where the explanatory variable is the between-MF
relative subsidy shock. Dependent and explanatory variables are first residualized with respect to bins of fixed 1999 char-
acteristics and lagged shocks. Bias-corrected fitted values and 1% confidence band are computed based on 1000 bootstrap
replications.
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Figure 13: Kernel Regressions: Between-MF Changes (1/3)
A. r 4-year Relative Growth Pre-Shock
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B. r 6-year Relative Growth Post-Shock
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Note: This Figure shows the outcomes of non-parametric regressions where the explanatory variable is the between-MF
relative subsidy shock. Dependent and explanatory variables are first residualized with respect to bins of fixed 1999 char-
acteristics and lagged shocks. Bias-corrected fitted values and 1% confidence band are computed based on 1000 bootstrap
replications.
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Appendices
A City Appeal
vj = (1− φ)(1− α) ln(1− α) + (1− φ)(1− α) ln(1− τw) + (1− φ)(1− α) ln(wj)
+ (1− φ)α ln(hj) + φδ ln(Gj) + φ(1− δ)
1
#aj
∑
j′∈aj
ln(Gj′)− φδ2κ ln(Nj)
− 2φδ(1− δ)κ 1
#aj
∑
j′∈aj
ln(Nj′)− φ(1− δ)2κ
1
#aj
∑
j′∈aj
ln(Nj′) + ln(EAj )
(35)
B DiD Robustness Checks
Let city total 20-65 population be
N = Np̄ + Np
where Np is the public sector population. Let sp = Np/N be the pre-shock share of public employ-
ees in the population. Within-MF changes in N following a shock can be decomposed as follows
d ln (N/N) =
d(N/N)
N/N
=
d(Np̄/N)
N/N
+
d(Np/N)
N/N
=
d(Np̄/N)
N/N
+
d(spN/N)
N/N
=
d(Np̄/N)
N/N
+ sp
ñ
d(N/N)
N/N
+
dsp
sp
ô
The share of migration responses coming from public employment is then
d(Np/N)
N/N
d(N/N)
N/N
= sp
1 + dsp/sp
d(N/N)
N/N

Figure 14 shows an estimate for dsp/sp
d(S/S)
S/S
of around 0.09. The estimate for
d(N/N)
N/N
d(S/S)
S/S
from section 4.4 is
around 0.03. The average estimate for the pre-shock ratio of public staff to total 20-65 population is
sp ≈ 3%. Estimate for the share of migration responses coming from public employment is hence
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≈ 3%× (1 + 0.09/0.03) = 12%. We get similar estimates when when including paid subsidies to third
parties in addition to public staff payroll.
C Local Public Good Supply: Time Consistency and No Inherited Wealth
We let public good G be a Cobb-Douglas index
ln G = ϕ ln Gs + (1− ϕ) ln G f (36)
where Gs is the stock of public capital and G f the flow of services annually consumed. Both are
directly measured as spending in terms of the numéraire good and we abstract from differences in
public good provision efficiency. Residents vote on the residence tax τ and the amount of Gs and
G f . Because we assumed homogeneous preferences, the voting mechanism is akin to a maximization
problem by a local social planner. We assume that residents are myopic and do not anticipate migration
responses.
Residents commit to policy {Gs,G f ,τ} for current and all future periods. They pay for G f every
year. Durable investments depreciate at annual rate ρ. To maintain a constant level of infrastructure,
residents hence have to pay Gs the first year and ρGs every following year. Cities inherit investment
Gsinit and debt Dinit from the past. In addition, they anticipate a constant flow of future subsidies equal
to F. Cities have access to international debt markets with fixed interest rate R. Residents’ preferred
policy is given by
max
Gs,G f ,τ
(1− α)(1−φ) ln
Ç
(1− τw)w− r(1+ τh)h
å
+ α(1−φ) ln(h)+φ(δ+ 1− δ|aj|
)
Ç
ϕ ln(Gs)+ (1− ϕ) ln(G f )
å
That is, after substituting in optimal housing and numéraire consumption
max
Gs,G f ,τ
−α(1− φ) ln(1 + τ) + φ(δ + 1− δ|aj|
)
Ç
ϕ ln(Gs) + (1− ϕ) ln(G f )
å
C.1 Optimal policy from t=0 (creation of the city)
In period t = 0 (e.g. the creation of the city), cities inherit zero investments Gsinit = 0 and debt Dinit = 0.
Residents choose and commit to a constant level of public good G0 and a constant tax rate τ0 for current
and all future periods {t = 0, t = 1, ...}. They furthermore assume that population won’t change in
future periods. When population changes because of say an amenity shock, the problem is reinitialized
at period 0, but this time with a history and an a priori non-zero initial city net wealth. Public goods
are durable but depreciate at speed ρ. To commit to the initially chosen Gs0 residents hence have to
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invest ρGs0 every period from t = 1. Residents receive a flow of subsidy equal to F and is assumed
constant over time (again, if F changes the problem is reinitialized at period 0 with an a priori non-zero
initial net wealth). Cities can levy debt each year {D0, D1, D2, ...} that has to be repaid in full the next
year, plus interests. Yearly budgets are given by
Gs0 + G
f
0 = D0 + τ0Nhr + F
ρGs0 + G
f
0 = −(1 + R)D0 + D1 + τ0Nhr + F
ρGs0 + G
f
0 = −(1 + R)D1 + D2 + τ0Nhr + F
...
ρGs0 + G
f
0 = −(1 + R)Dt−1 + Dt + τ0Nhr + F
...
(37)
Let’s multiply each budget line by
pt =
Ç
1
1 + R
åt
(38)
and sum all lines up to t = T
Gs0 + ρG
s
0
T∑
t=1
pt + G
f
0
T∑
t=0
pt =
T∑
t=0
ptDt − (1 + R)
T∑
t=1
ptDt−1 + τ0Nhr
T∑
t=0
pt + F
T∑
t=0
pt (39)
that is
Gs0 + G
f
0 + (ρG
s
0 + G
f
0 )
T∑
t=1
pt = pTDT + τ0Nhr
T∑
t=0
pt + F
T∑
t=0
pt (40)
Take the limit when T → ∞ assuming that the no-Ponzi scheme condition holds ie that
lim
T→∞
pTDT = 0 (41)
We get the inter-temporal budget constraint
ζGs0 + G
f
0 = τ0Nhr + F (42)
Note that we can express the debt stock at all t by solving
Dt = (1 + R)Dt−1 + ρGs0 + G
f
0 − τ0Nhr− F = (1 + R)Dt−1 + (ρ− 1)G
s
0 + D0
i.e. (noticing an arithmetico-geometric sequence)
Dt = (1 + R)t
Ç
D0
1 + R
R
+ (ρ− 1)Gs0
1
R
å
− 1
R
Ç
(ρ− 1)Gs0 + D0
å
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rewriting
ptDt = D0
1 + R
R
+ (ρ− 1)Gs0
1
R
− pt
1
R
Ç
(ρ− 1)Gs0 + D0
å
Taking the limit when t→ ∞ using the no-Ponzi condition yields
0 = D0
1 + R
R
+ (ρ− 1)Gs0
1
R
(43)
so that finally we show that debt is constant and that we are in a stationary setting (holding envi-
ronment fixed).
Dt = D0 =
1− ρ
1 + R
G0 (44)
C.2 Optimal policy from t=1 (keeping environment fixed)
At period 1, cities inherit debt (plus interests) and depreciated assets from period 0 that is
(1− ρ)Gs0 − (1 + R)D0
However, according to equation (43) this quantity is exactly zero. The optimization problem in period
1 is hence the same as in period 0, and policy choices from period 1 onward are unchanged compared
to those in period 0. The proof by induction for any t follows straightforwardly.
C.3 Optimal policy from t=1 (with a change in the environment)
Initial net city wealth is zero so the problem is reinitialized at period zero following a shock to the
environment. The environment has changed however, so policy choices may be different in the new
equilibrium.
D Welfare
D.1 Getting the residuals
In the simplified case where we assume away public subsidies and revenues other than the residence
tax, the equilibrium is defined by the following equations.
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Nj =
exp(vj/σ)∑
j′
exp(vj/σ)
(45)
vj = (1− φ)α ln α + (1− φ)(1− α) ln(1− α) (46)
+ (1− φ) ln((1− τw)wj)− (1− φ)α ln(1 + τhj )− (1− φ)α ln(rj) (47)
+ φδ ln(Gj) + φ
1− δ
#aj
∑
j∈aj
ln Gj′
− φκδ2 ln Nj − φκ
1− δ2
#aj
∑
j∈aj
ln Nj′ + σθAj
ln(rj) =
1
η
ln
Hj
Tj
+ θCj (48)
1 + τhj = 1 +
φ(δ + 1−δ|aj| )
(1− φ)α (49)
Gj
î
1 + τhj
ó
=
ϕϕ(1− ϕ)1−ϕ
ζ ϕ
τhj Njwjα(1− τw) (50)
Equations 49 and 50 are the vote conditions in our simplified version 28. Equations 45, 47 and 48 are
identical in the simplified case and in our baseline model with subsidies.
We note No, Go, vo, ro, τo all the equilibrium variables in the normal case and Nn, Gn, vn, rn, τn all
equilibrium variables in the simplified version. With our data we observe each year a set of equilibrium
variables No, Go, vo, ro, τo. We show that we can deduce equilibrium variables Nn, Gn, vn, rn, τn from
observed data. It is equivalent to infer residuals θAj , θ
C
j from observed data.
We rewrite equilibrium conditions 45, 47 and 48
Nj =
exp(vj/σ)∑
j′
exp(vj′/σ)
(51)
vj = −
η
η + 1
(1− φ)α ln
Ä
1 + τaj
ä
+ φδ ln(Gj) + φ
1− δ
#aj
∑
j∈aj
ln Gj′ (52)
−
(1− φ)α 1
η + 1
+ φκδ2
 ln Nj − φκ 1− δ2#aj
∑
j′∈aj
ln Nj′ + σΘAj
ln rj =
1
η + 1
ln Nj −
1
η + 1
ln
Ä
1 + τaj
ä
+ Θrj (53)
28The vote conditions derive from the following optimization problem: max
τHj ,G
s
j ,G
f
j ,Gj
Å
Gδj
∏
j′∈aj G
1−δ
|aj |
j′
ãφ
C1−φj under the
constraints ζGsj + G
f
j = Njhjrjτ
H
j , Gj =
(
Gs
)ϕ(G fj )1−ϕ, Cj = c1−αj hαj , cj = (1− α)wj(1− τW), hj = αwj(1−τW )rj(1+τHj )
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with the transformed residuals
Θrj =
η
η + 1
θCj +
1
η + 1
ln
αwj(1− τW)
Tj
σΘAj = (1− φ)α ln α + (1− φ)(1− α) ln(1− α) + (1− φ) ln((1− τw)wj)− (1− φ)αΘrj + φδΘGj
+ φ
1− δ
#aj
∑
j∈aj
ΘGj′ + θ
A
j
We define the following operators:
• X j = Xj −
∑
j∈a
Xj
#aj
• X j = exp(ln(Xj))
• X∼ aj =
∑
j′∈a
Xj′
#a −
∑
a′
∑
j′∈a′
Xj′
J#a′
• ÙXj = exp(ln∼ (Xj))
• X̂j = Xj −
∑
j′
Xj′
J
• X̌j = exp( ˆln(Xj))
Applying L operator to equations 49, 50, 51, and 52 we get
σ + (1− φ)α 1
η + 1
+ φκδ2 − φδ
 ln Nnj
Noj
= φδ
Ç
ln Noj − ln Goj + ln wj
å
+
η
η + 1
(1− φ)α ln 1 + τoj (54)
Applying L∼ operator to equations 50, 51, and 52 we get
σ + (1− φ)α
(η + 1)
+ φκ − φ
 ln Ñna
N̂oa
= φ
Ç
ln N̂oa − ln Ĝoa + ln ŵa + lnıτna − ln˚ 1 + τna å
− η
η + 1
(1− φ)α ln
˚ 1 + τna
1̇ + τoa
(55)
We have
Nnj
Noj
=
Ñnj N
n
j
N̂oj N
o
j
∑
j′ N̂oj′N
o
j′∑
j′ Ñnj′N
n
j′
(56)
With equations 49, 54, 55, 56 and 50 – in this order – we get τnj , N
n
j , G
n
j .
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D.2 After the merger
Now we depart from our simplified version by assuming all cities within a municipal federation coop-
erate for the production of public goods. There is still no business tax and no state subsidies. Prior to
the merger, residents vote for public goods in each city. Following the merger, residents vote for a new
level of public goods pooling resources of all former member cities. To keep welfare comparable be-
tween pre- and post-reform situations, we assume that prior jurisdictions still exist for the purpose of
labor and housing markets. The only thing that changes is the level at which public good is supplied.
Housing tax rates are fixed by MF council whose preferences reflect exactly those of all inhabitants
of the MF. For a given MF a the council chooses the housing tax rate and the level of local public good
G which maximize vj – with j a city belonging to the MF – the budget constraint
∑
j′∈a rj′Nj′hj′τhj′ = G.
Importantly the optimization problem gives the same G and τH for all j belonging to a. Once G is
chosen it is split and a share is allocated to each city. We assume in our reform that the allocation rule
keeps the previous share unchanged, that is city j gets the share
Gnj∑
j′∈aj
Gn
j′
of G. We could, however,
choose another rule, such as an egalitarian rule.
We note Nm, Gm, vm, rm, τm all the equilibrium variable in the merger case.
The new vote conditions are29
1 + τma = 1 +
φ
(1− φ)α (57)
Gmj =
ϕϕ(1− ϕ)1−ϕ
ζ ϕ
Gnj∑
j′∈aj G
n
j′
∑
j′∈aj
τmj′
1 + τmj′
Nmj′ wj′α(1− τw) (58)
τma and Gma are independant of the allocation rule chosen.
Equations 51, 52 and 53 still hold. We now rewrite Nm, Gm, vm, rm, τm as function of Nn, Gn, vn, rn, τn.
Applying L operator to equations 49, 50, 51, 52, 57, and 58 we get
Nmj = N
n
j (59)
The allocation of population within any MF keeps constant.
29The vote conditions derive from the following optimization problem: max
τHaj ,Gaj ,G
s
aj
,G faj
Å[
Gaj wj
]δ∏
j′∈aj
[
Gaj wj′
] 1−δ|aj | ãφC1−φj
under the constraints ζGsaj + G
f
aj =
∑
j′∈aj Njhjrjτ
H
aj , Gaj =
(
Gsaj
)ϕ(G faj)1−ϕ, Cj = c1−αj hαj , cj = (1 − α)wj(1 − τW),
hj =
αw(1−τW )
rj(1+τHaj )
.
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Note that
Gmj =
Gnj∑
j′∈aj G
n
j′
∑
j′∈a
Gnj′
τmj′
1 + τmj′
1 + τnj′
τnj′
Nmj′
Nnj′
=
 ∏
j′∈aj
Nmj′
Nnj′
 1#aj Gnj∑
j′∈aj G
n
j′
∑
j′∈aj
Gnj′
τmj′
1 + τmj′
1 + τnj′
τnj′
Nmj′
Nnj′
=
 ∏
j′∈aj
Nmj′
Nnj′
 1#aj Gnj∑
j′∈aj G
n
j′
∑
j′∈aj
Gnj′
τmj′
1 + τmj′
1 + τnj′
τnj′
(60)
We define Xa such as
Xa
Gnj
=
∑
j′∈a Gnj′
τm
j′
1+τm
j′
1+τn
j′
τn
j′∑
j′∈aj G
n
j′
(61)
Applying L∼ operator to equations 50, 51, 52, 57, 58, 60 and 61 we get
σ + (1− φ)α 1
η + 1
+ φκ − φ
 ln Ñmj
Ñnj
= φ ln
X̂a
Ĝna
− η
η + 1
(1− φ)α ln
˚ 1 + τma˚ 1 + τna (62)
We have
Nmj
Nnj
=
Ñmj N
m
j
Ñnj N
n
j
∑
j′ Ñnj′N
n
j′∑
j′ Ñmj′ N
m
j′
(63)
With equations 57,59, 60, 61, 62, 63 and 58 – in this order – we get τmj , N
m
j , G
m
j .
Eventually we have
vmj − vnj = φδ ln
Gmj
Gnj
+ φ
1− δ
#aj
∑
j∈aj
ln
Gmj′
Gnj′
−
(1− φ)α 1
η + 1
+ φκδ2
 ln Nmj
Nnj
(64)
− φκ 1− δ
2
#aj
∑
j′∈aj
ln
Nmj′
Nnj′
− η
η + 1
(1− φ)α ln
Ç1 + τmaj
1 + τnaj
å
D.3 Welfare comparison
We define social welfare as
W = E max
j
uij = E max
j
Ä
vj + εij
ä
Since idiosyncratic shock follow a Gumbel law, we have30
W = σζ + σ ln
Ç∑
j
e
vj
σ
å
30ζ is the Euler constant.
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hence
Wo = σζ +
∑
j
voj
J
+ σ ln
Ñ∑
j
exp
Çvj −∑j vojJ
σ
åé
Note that Ňnj = exp
Ç“vnj
σ
å
therefore
Wn = σζ +
∑
j
vnj
J
+ σ ln
Ç∑
j
Ňnj
å
and
Wm = σζ +
∑
j
vnj
J
+ σ ln
∑
j
Ňnj exp
vmj − vnj
σ

Eventually
Wm −Wn = σ ln
Ç∑
j Ňnj exp
vmj −v
n
j
σ∑
j Ňnj
å
(65)
D.4 Welfare estimation
For the estimation of welfare change, we use parameters estimates of section 5 and their estimated
variance-covariance structure. As we have as many parameters estimates as we have IV specifications,
we take the average across specifications for each parameter to compute the point estimate for welfare
change. We compute Monte-Carlo standard errors by simulating 10,000 new values for each parameter
using the estimated variance-covariance matrix. We then get the mean estimate for κ, φ, δ, σ across
specifications. We then estimate the welfare impact of a reform for each of these simulated set of
parameters and compute percentile-based standard errors. As for η and α, we take standard values
from the literature. In our baseline scenario we take η = 0.2 and α = 0.3.
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Figure 14: Changes in (Public Employees)/ (20-65 Population)
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Note: This Figure plots the coefficient of regressions similar to section 4 regressions. The dependent variable is the pro-
portional change in the absolute share of public employees in city population ∆ ln(sp) and the explanatory variable is the
within-MF subsidy shock ∆ ln(S/S). Standard errors are clustered at the MF level. We report the 5% confidence bands.
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